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AIRLINE EMPLOYEES ARE NOT REPORTING 
VIOLATIONS BECAUSE THEY LACK 
ADEQUATE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION:  
ARE YOU READY FOR TAKEOFF? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Dave was a mechanic for Fly High Airlines at an International 
Airport for over twenty years.1  On his last shift working for the airlines, 
a Boeing 737 landed safely and taxied up to the gate.2  The pilot who 
flew the plane informed the mechanics that he heard loud barrel canning 
noises at his feet throughout the flight.  Dave investigated the problem 
before signing the plane off to fly its next route.  He detected a problem 
with the struts in the fuselage and noticed that the mechanical defect was 
written up in the maintenance logs five times in the last week without 
being repaired.3  The struts in the fuselage were manufactured in 1968, 
and worn out to the extent that they caused a safety hazard in flight.  At 
this point, the airplane’s reliability was essentially the equivalent of a car 
manufactured in the 1960s.4  Unfortunately, a plane is incapable of 
pulling over if it experiences a mechanical emergency en route.  Dave 
grounded the plane and sent it to the hangar for maintenance.  However, 
the airline manager threatened to fire him if he reported the violations to 
the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) and did not sign the plane 
off to fly its scheduled route.5  Ironically, firing Dave and flying the plane 
                                                 
1 This hypothetical was created by the author. 
2 See About the 737 Family, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/737family/ 
background.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2011) (stating that the 737 is “the world’s most 
popular and reliable commercial jet”). 
3 See A Glossary of Aviation Terms and Abbreviations, AEROFILES (June 30, 2008), 
http://www.aerofiles.com/glossary.html (explaining that a fuselage is “[a]n aircraft’s 
main body structure housing the flight crew, passengers, and cargo and to which the 
wings, tail and, in most single-engined airplanes, engine are attached”); see also Terry 
Ward, How Safe is Your Plane?, AOL TRAVEL NEWS (Apr. 8, 2010, 1:43 PM), 
http://news.travel.aol.com/2010/04/08/how-safe-is-your-plane/ (illustrating similar 
maintenance violations by Southwest Airlines).  In March 2008, Southwest Airlines was 
charged with a $10.2 million fine for operating 46 planes on 59,791 flights without 
performing mandatory inspections for cracking in the plane’s fuselage.  Id. 
4 See John W. Lincoln, Managing the Aging Aircraft Problem KN-1 (Oct. 2011), available at 
http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFullText/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-079(II)///MP-079(II)-
(SM)-$KN.pdf (discussing the safety and economic implications of aging aircraft).  Aging 
aircrafts have the potential of deteriorating flight safety if they are not properly 
maintained.  Id. at KN-3.  Fatigue cracking is one of the major challenges for aging aircrafts.  
Id. at KN-1.  In 1988, fatigue cracking in the fuselage of a Boeing 737 resulted in the loss of 
the upper fuselage in flight.  Id. at KN-7. 
5 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 301(a), 72 Stat. 731, 744 
(establishing the Federal Aviation Agency, which later became the FAA); 63 Fed. Reg. 
Patrick: Airline Employees Are Not Reporting Violations Because They Lack
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
212 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
in its unairworthy condition would have resulted in more violations for 
the airline. 
Dave refused to sign the plane off to fly.  He sent the plane to the 
hangar for maintenance and reported the violations to the FAA.  Dave 
was terminated.  After evaluating his options, Dave decided to bring a 
state whistleblower claim against Fly High Airlines instead of a federal 
claim.6  Dave knew his claim had merit and did not want to go through 
the hassle involved with the Federal Whistleblower Protection Program 
(“WPP”), which would have required a complaint and investigation 
procedure with the Department of Labor (“DOL”).7  Fly High Airlines 
removed the claim to federal court and argued that the state 
whistleblower claim was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act 
(“ADA”), as amended by the WPP.8 
Unfortunately, the outcome of Dave’s case will depend on which 
circuit is deciding the issue.  Currently, there is a circuit split as to 
whether the ADA, as amended by the WPP, preempts state 
whistleblower claims.9  The Eighth Circuit held that state whistleblower 
                                                                                                             
61206, 61316 (Nov. 9, 1998) (“The stated FAA mission is to provide a safe, secure, and 
efficient global aviation system.”); see also JOHN W. FISCHER, BART ELIAS AND ROBERT S. 
KIRK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34467, U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY:  ISSUES AND ROLE OF 
CONGRESS 11 (2008) (stating that “the FAA has been given broad authority to regulate and 
promote safety within the airline industry”). 
6 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1734 (9th ed. 2009) (defining whistleblower act and 
whistleblower).  A whistleblower act is “[a] federal or state law protecting employees from 
retaliation for properly disclosing employer wrongdoing such as violating a law or 
regulation, mismanaging public funds, abusing authority, or endangering public health or 
safety.”  Id.  A whistleblower is “[a]n employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a 
governmental or law enforcement agency.”  Id.; see also Jacqueline P. Taylor, The World of 
Whistleblowers:  Are They Sinners or Saints?, WOMENOF.COM, http://www.womenof.com/ 
THE_WORLD_OF_WHISTLEBLOWERS_ARE_THEY_SINNERS_OR_SAINTS-Article.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2011) (explaining whistleblowers, their goals behind blowing the 
whistle, and the risks they face).  The common characteristics among whistleblowers are 
“their ethics-driven reasons for whistleblowing, their whistleblowing experiences, and the 
resulting retaliation directed at them by their adversaries.”  Id.  “[T]he primary goal 
whistleblowers usually seek is accountability for misbehavior and correction of the 
problems they see in the work place.”  Id. 
7 See Whistleblower Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) (2006) (explaining the 
DOL process); infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text (explaining the complaint and 
investigation procedure with the DOL). 
8 See Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2006) (stating the express 
preemption provision of the ADA); 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (providing federal whistleblower 
protection to airline employees). 
9 Compare Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that the WPP does not preempt state whistleblower claims), with Botz v. Omni Air 
Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 498 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the flight attendant’s claim under the 
Minnesota whistleblower statute was preempted by the ADA as amended by the WPP).  
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claims are preempted by the WPP while the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits adopted an opposing view.10  A resolution is necessary to ensure 
airline employees are treated equally throughout the country.  Adopting 
the majority position, state whistleblower claims should not be held 
within the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision, and the WPP does 
not alter or expand this scope.  Airline employees should be allowed to 
bring state claims against their employers because it will encourage 
violation reporting in the future, which will ensure the highest level of 
aviation safety. 
First, Part II of this Note will discuss the relevant statutes, the federal 
preemption doctrine, and case law leading up to the circuit split 
concerning whether the WPP preempts state whistleblower claims.11  
Second, Part III will analyze the opposing views taken by the circuits and 
explore the problems with the Eighth Circuit’s approach of interpreting 
the WPP to expand the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision.12  
Lastly, Part IV will propose two alternative solutions—an amendment to 
the WPP and adoption of the majority position—to ameliorate the circuit 
split, encourage violation reporting, and ensure safety remains the top 
priority in the aviation industry.13 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Congress amended the ADA to include the WPP, which provides 
federal whistleblower protection for airline employees.14  The WPP’s 
statutory language is silent as to preemption; however, the circuits 
disagree on whether the WPP expands the scope of the ADA’s 
preemption provision to include all state whistleblower claims.15 
                                                                                                             
See generally 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (stating the ADA’s preemption clause); 49 U.S.C. 
§ 42121 (adding the WPP to the ADA). 
10 See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that state 
whistleblower claims are not preempted by the ADA, as amended by the WPP); Gary v. 
Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the addition of the WPP did not 
expand the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64  
(holding that state whistleblower claims are not preempted by the WPP); Botz, 286 F.3d at 
498 (holding that the WPP preempts state whistleblower claims). 
11 See infra Part II (explaining the history and purpose behind the ADA and its 
preemption provision, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the preemption provision, the 
WPP, and the opposing views in the circuits regarding the WPP and whether it expands 
the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision). 
12 See infra Part III (analyzing the split in the circuits regarding the WPP and whether it 
expands the scope of the ADA’s preemption clause). 
13 See infra Part IV (explaining possible solutions to the circuit split). 
14 See infra Part II.D (discussing the federal remedy for airline whistleblowers). 
15 See infra Part II.E (discussing the circuit split). 
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Part II.A will begin with a brief history of the ADA, providing the 
foundation necessary to understand the purpose behind its preemption 
clause.16  After introducing the ADA, Part II.B will discuss the ADA’s 
preemption clause and the federal preemption doctrine.17  Next, Part II.C 
will examine two Supreme Court cases that interpreted the language and 
scope of the preemption clause.18  Then, Part II.D will explore the 
relevant portions of the WPP.19  Lastly, Part II.E will journey through the 
two different positions the circuit courts have taken as to whether the 
ADA, as amended by the WPP, preempts state whistleblower claims.20 
A. History of the ADA 
The airline industry was heavily regulated long before the passage of 
the ADA in 1978.21  Since 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”) 
regulated all domestic interstate air travel.22  The Federal Aviation Act of 
1958 (“1958 Act”) gave the CAB authority to regulate airfares, routes, 
and services of the interstate airline industry along with the power to 
                                                 
16 See infra Part II.A (explaining the history and purpose of the ADA). 
17 See infra Part II.B (explaining federal preemption of state law and the ADA’s 
preemption provision). 
18 See infra Part II.C (explaining the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the language in 
the ADA’s preemption provision). 
19 See infra Part II.D (discussing the enactment of the WPP). 
20 See infra Part II.E (discussing the two opposing views in the circuit courts regarding 
the WPP and whether it alters the scope of the ADA’s preemption clause). 
21 See AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES:  AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT, UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 29–30 (2010) 
[hereinafter AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES] (explaining how “the federal Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) had regulated all domestic interstate air transport routes as a 
public utility, setting fares, routes, and schedules”). 
22 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973, amended by Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731; see AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
supra note 21, at 29 (explaining how the CAB started regulating the airline industry in 
1937); ELIZABETH E. BAILEY ET AL., DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 11 (Richard Schmalensee 
ed., 1989) (explaining that the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 created the CAB and gave it 
the authority to regulate the airline industry).  The CAB consisted of a five-member 
independent regulatory agency.  Id.  The CAB had the authority to control who entered the 
industry, what routes an air carrier could enter, and who could leave the industry along 
with the authority to “regulate fares . . . , award direct subsidies to air carriers, control 
mergers and intercarrier agreements, . . . investigate deceptive trade practices and unfair 
methods of competition, exempt carriers from certain provisions of the act,” and regulate 
safety.  Id.; JEFFREY R. MILLER, THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION HANDBOOK 3 (1981) (explaining 
that “[o]ne of the main reasons for the Civil Aeronautics [A]ct of 1938 was to protect 
existing air carriers from competition and enable the infant industry to grow”).  Since 1938, 
the CAB regulated the nation’s airlines, which resulted in the airlines’ remarkable growth.  
Id. at 1. 
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take administrative action against the airlines.23  Consequently, an 
interstate airline had to apply to the CAB when it wanted a new route or 
an airfare change.24  Significantly, the 1958 Act included a “saving 
clause” that stated federal regulations would not interfere with state law 
or common law already in existence pertaining to remedies, and it did 
not include a clause preempting state law.25   In fact, the states regulated 
intrastate airlines, which sold tickets at lower prices than CAB regulated 
airlines and aided in prompting deregulation.26  The heavy regulation by 
the CAB was inefficient and imposed high costs on consumers.27  Thus, 
                                                 
23 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.  The 1958 Act 
empowered the CAB to regulate the interstate airline industry.  § 102(b), 72 Stat. at 740; see 
BAILEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 11 (discussing how the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 
separated safety regulation from economic regulation).  Originally, the CAB had the 
authority to regulate safety.  Id.  After the 1958 Act, the role of the CAB was to promote 
“adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable rates [and] foster 
competition to the extent necessary to ensure ‘sound development.’”  Id.; see also MILLER, 
supra note 22, at 3 (stating that the 1958 Act created the FAA and transferred the authority 
to regulate airline safety to the FAA). 
24 See AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 30 (“The CAB earned a 
reputation for bureaucratic complacency; airlines were subject to lengthy delays when 
applying for new routes or fare changes, which were not often approved.”).  World 
Airways applied to the CAB to begin a low-fare route from New York City to Los Angeles 
and it took over six years for the CAB to study the request, which they dismissed because 
the record was “stale.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731, 798.  “Nothing 
contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at 
common law or by statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies.”  
Id.; see Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995) (explaining that the federal 
statute did not include a preemption provision when it was first enacted).  The “saving 
clause stat[es] [that] [n]othing . . . in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the 
remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are 
in addition to such remedies.”  Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) (stating that the “‘saving 
clause’” enabled states “to regulate intrastate airfares (including those offered by interstate 
air carriers),” and state regulation was not expressly preempted by the 1958 Act). 
26 See AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 29 (explaining how intrastate 
airlines were regulated by the state governments in which they operated, and not the CAB); 
see also John W. Barnum, What Prompted Airline Deregulation 20 Years Ago? What Were 
the Objectives of That Deregulation and How Were They Achieved?, Presentation to the 
Aeronautical Law Committee of the Business Law Section of the International Bar 
Association (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://library.findlaw.com/1988/Sep/1/129304. 
html (discussing the success of intrastate carriers and its effect on deregulation).  Intrastate 
carriers that were not regulated by the CAB were selling airline tickets at much lower 
prices than the CAB regulated airlines.  Id. 
27 See AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 30 (“Most of the major airlines, 
whose profits were virtually guaranteed, favored the rigid system.”).  The airlines did not 
mind such heavy regulation because the passengers were the ones paying the escalating 
fares.  Id.; BAILEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 1 (discussing the effect of regulation and the trend 
of deregulation in the mid 1970s).  In the mid 1970s, it was “argued that regulation raised 
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Congress was concerned that the airline industry would eventually 
crash.28 
In 1975, Congress held hearings related to airline deregulation.29  
Congress determined that “maximum reliance on competitive market 
                                                                                                             
prices and limited the variety of goods and services available to consumers in many 
industries.”  Id.  Thus, “deregulation became the rallying cry of observers of the federal 
government’s regulatory agencies.”  Id.; DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES vii (Sam 
Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000) (discussing the purpose behind deregulation in 
the network industries).  In the 1970s, the United States started to deregulate a variety of 
network industries, such as the energy, transportation, and communication industries.  Id.  
The overall purpose of deregulation was to promote competition and benefit consumers.  
Id.  The goal behind deregulating network industries was to allow markets to determine 
the allocation of resources, rather than regulators, and stimulate competition.  Id. at vii–viii. 
28 See AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 30 (“Congress became concerned 
that air transport in the long run might follow the nation’s railroads into trouble; in 1970 
the Penn Central Railroad had collapsed in what was then the largest bankruptcy in 
history . . . .”); DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES, supra note 27, at 41 (discussing 
deregulation in the railroad industry).  The railroad industry was deregulated because its 
performance under regulation was financially unsuccessful.  Id.  Penn Central, the nation’s 
largest railroad, and a half a dozen other railroads declared bankruptcy in 1970.  Id.  It was 
argued “that regulation was inhibiting rail profitability and that the industry needed much 
greater pricing and operating freedom to avoid more bankruptcies.”  Id. at 41–42.  
Therefore, Congress began its attempt to deregulate the railroad industry.  Id. at 42.  
Deregulation increased the railroads’ freedom to operate, stimulated competition, and 
benefited both consumers and the railroad industry.  Id. at 43–45.  As of 1998, operating 
costs per ton-mile “were 60 percent lower than when deregulation began.”  Id. at 43; see also 
Barnum, supra note 26 (discussing how too much economic regulation can lead to 
bankruptcy).  “[O]ne of the main reasons that the Penn Central and the Erie and the others 
had gone bankrupt was because there had been too much railroad too little utilized, and 
that there had been too much railroad because there had been too much public-utility-type 
economic regulation of the railroads.”  Id.  The bankruptcies that resulted from regulating 
the railroad industry aided in the decision to deregulate the airlines before they followed 
the trend of the railroads.  Id. 
29 AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 30; see Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978:  Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, 98th Cong. (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearings] (statement of Frank Willis, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, Department of 
Transportation) (explaining the concept of deregulation).  “[D]eregulation is all about 
businessmen exploring the marketplace finding out what works and having the flexibility 
to create or modify operations as the marketplace dictates.”  Id.  See generally Barnum, supra 
note 26 (discussing seven factors that prompted airline deregulation).  The first factor was 
airline pricing.  Id.  The cost of airline tickets was increasing, and the airlines lacked the 
ability to change fares because they were regulated similar to that of public utilities.  Id.  
The second and third factors were the CAB’s regulation of who entered the airline business 
and what routes an airline could fly.  Id.  The fourth factor was the issue of significant 
delays imposed by the CAB.  Id.  The CAB frequently sat on applications from airlines who 
applied for entry or a new route.  Id.  The fifth factor was that the CAB approved capacity 
limitation agreements and immunized airlines from antitrust attacks.  Id.  The sixth factor 
was the fact that planes were flying only half full even though “most travelers would 
prefer to fly on fuller planes in order to pay less.”  Id.  Furthermore, intrastate carriers that 
were not regulated by the CAB showed the public that it was possible to achieve 
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forces” would best benefit the airline industry by advancing efficiency, 
innovation, low prices, and the quality of services.30  Consequently, the 
ADA was signed into law on October 24, 1978; its main purpose was “to 
remove government control over fares, routes and market entry (of new 
airlines) from commercial aviation.”31  The regulatory powers of the CAB 
were to be gradually diminished, allowing airline passengers to 
experience market forces in the airline industry.32  The ADA would 
                                                                                                             
satisfactory service while flying fuller planes.  Id.  The last factor that provoked 
deregulation was “the well publicized success of a few intrastate carriers like PSA and 
Southwest that were not regulated by the CAB and that were selling seats for much less 
than their CAB-regulated competition.”  Id. 
30 124 CONG. REC. 30662 (1978); see Morales, 504 U.S. at 378 (discussing the congressional 
intent behind the ADA). 
31 AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 29.  The goals of the ADA included: 
[T]he maintenance of safety as the highest priority in air commerce; 
placing maximum reliance on competition in providing air 
transportation services; the encouragement of air service at major 
urban areas through secondary or satellite airports; the avoidance of 
unreasonable industry concentration which would tend to allow one 
or more air carriers to unreasonably increase prices, reduce services, or 
exclude competition; and the encouragement of entry into air 
transportation markets by new air carriers, the encouragement of entry 
into additional markets by existing air carriers, and the continued 
strengthening of small air carriers. 
Id. at 31; see 1983 Hearings, supra note 29 (statement of Frank Willis, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, Department of Transportation) (discussing 
the elimination of government control in the industry and the desire to remain 
deregulated).  He stated: 
[W]e believe that airline deregulation has given the public a broader 
range of choices and services and prices, and it has expanded business 
opportunities, promoted employment opportunities and stimulated 
efficiency in the industry as a whole.  We think there is a compelling 
case for deregulation being made in the marketplace, and the best 
evidence we can present for that is that there is no cry in the 
commercial airline industry nor among its users for a return to 
extensive Government control. 
Id. 
32 See AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 29 (discussing the diminishing 
powers of the CAB); BAILEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 34 (explaining how the regulatory 
authority of the CAB gradually diminished).  The author explained: 
The Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) proposed a gradual relaxation of 
the CAB’s regulation of the industry, with full rate and route authority 
to phase out over a four-year period.  The Board’s authority over 
routes was to end on December 31, 1981, and its authority over fares 
on January 1, 1983.  Its authority over domestic mergers, intercarrier 
agreements, and interlocking directorates would transfer to the 
Department of Justice on January 1, 1983.  The Board would cease 
operations entirely on January 1, 1985.  The remaining tasks of 
international negotiation and small community air service would shift 
to the Department of Transportation on that date. 
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stimulate open competition in the airline industry, encourage new 
airlines to enter the market, allow service in small communities to 
continue, and encourage the use of secondary airports in large cities.33 
Ultimately, the ADA eliminated heavy government-imposed 
regulation and gave airlines the freedom to compete in the market.34  
Furthermore, the ADA enabled airlines to control their own ticket prices, 
routes, and entry into the market, which allowed consumers to benefit 
from lower prices.35 
B. ADA’s Preemption Provision and Federal Preemption of State Law 
In addition to deregulating the airlines, it was important to ensure 
that state regulation did not interfere with the ADA’s objectives.36  
Therefore, Congress included an express preemption provision in the 
ADA to prevent state regulation from adversely affecting the federal 
deregulation process.37  However, Congress did not alter or repeal the 
“saving clause” of the 1958 Act when it enacted this provision.38 
                                                                                                             
Id.; see also 1983 Hearings, supra note 29 (statement of Frank Willis, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, Department of Transportation) (discussing 
the impact the ADA of 1978 had on the airline industry).  The result of airline deregulation 
“has been an increased competitive environment with positive effects on service, efficiency, 
and fares.”  Id. 
33 MILLER, supra note 22, at 11; see DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES, supra note 27, 
at 1 (discussing the benefits of deregulation in the airline industry).  According to 
economists, a public policy is successful when its benefits outweigh its costs.  Id.  The 
benefits of deregulating the airlines far exceed the costs.  Id.  Deregulating the airlines 
“allow[ed] airlines to set their own fares and decide which markets to serve.”  Id.  On 
average, the fares in the deregulated airline market “were immediately lower . . . than they 
would have been had they continued to be regulated.”  Id.  Customers also benefited from 
deregulation because it allowed the airlines to serve all markets.  Id.  at 2.  Thus, travelers 
did not have to make as many connections.  Id.  As a result, customers were not required to 
change airlines as frequently.  Id. 
34 See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text (explaining the effects of deregulation in 
the airline industry). 
35 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining how deregulation benefitted the 
airline industry). 
36 See supra Part II.A (explaining the purpose of the ADA and its objectives). 
37 Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2006); see Morales v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378–79 (1992) (“To ensure that the States would not undo 
federal deregulation with regulation of their own, the ADA included a pre-emption 
provision, prohibiting the States from enforcing any law ‘relating to rates, routes, or 
services’ of any carrier.”). 
38 Morales, 504 U.S. at 378–79 (1992).  The “‘saving clause’ [states] that ‘[n]othing . . . in 
this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or 
by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.” Id. at 378 
(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1506); see Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Preemption by Airline 
Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1), of State Law Labor-Related Claims, 41 A.L.R. FED. 
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The ADA’s preemption provision prohibits states from “enact[ing] 
or enforc[ing] . . . law[s], regulation[s], or other provision[s] having the 
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air 
carrier.”39  Unfortunately, the term “service” in the preemption clause is 
vague and undefined, which has caused courts to adopt different 
definitions of the term over the years.40  Some courts apply a broad 
definition of service, extending the scope of the preemption clause to 
include claims dealing with issues such as baggage handling and 
boarding procedures.41  Other courts adopt a more narrow definition of 
                                                                                                             
2D 215, § 3 (2009) (discussing the express savings clause that was retained in the ADA 
despite the ADA’s preemption provision).  The author discussed how: 
Congress intended to occupy the field of regulation of airline services, 
prices, and routes, but it did not intend to alter those remedies existing 
under the common law in other fields pertaining to airlines. . . . The 
existence of a savings clause does not alone, however, allow the 
creation of federal common law in the absence of congressional intent 
to fashion such a remedy.  Further, this general remedies savings 
clause may not undermine the effect of the ADA’s express preemption 
provision and therefore does not shelter state actions from preemption. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
39 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1); cf. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 223 n.1 (1995) 
(explaining how this title of the United States Code was reenacted in 1994).  Congress 
revised this clause and changed the wording, but Congress intended no substantive change 
to be made.  Id. 
40 See Eric E. Murphy, Federal Preemption of State Law Relating to an Air Carrier’s Services, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1202–17 (2004) [hereinafter Air Carrier’s Services] (presenting the 
different definitions of “services” that have been adopted by courts).  The Supreme Court 
has never interpreted the term “services” in the preemption provision.  Id. at 1202.  Courts 
have adopted very different definitions of the term “service” that range between a broad 
definition, which is the most preemptive, and a narrow definition, which is the least 
preemptive.  Id. at 1202–03.  The broad definition of “services” interprets the term as 
including all matters in “the contractual arrangement between the airline and the user of 
the service.”  Id. at 1203 (quoting Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 
1995)).  Examples of items that would be included would be “ticketing, boarding 
procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the 
transportation itself.”  Id. (quoting Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336).  This definition has “broad 
preemptive effect.”  Id.  Some courts use this definition in a more limited manner by giving 
it exceptions, such as “distinguishing between a service and the operation of the plane and 
between economic and safety services.”  Id. at 1205.  Other courts apply the narrow 
definition of “services,” which interprets the term as meaning air services.  Id. at 1206.  The 
narrow definition includes things related to actual air transportation and scheduling, 
limiting the scope of preemption.  Id. 
41 See Arapahoe Cnty. Pub. Airport Auth. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 242 F.3d 1213, 1222 
(10th Cir. 2001) (accepting the broad definition of “services” adopted by Hodges); Smith v. 
Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 1998) (adopting the broad definition established in 
Hodges); Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1433 
(7th Cir. 1996) (accepting the Fifth Circuit’s broad definition of “services”); Hodges, 44 F.3d 
at 336 (defining services as having a broad definition).  Hodges determined that: 
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“service,” limiting the scope of preemption to claims actually related to 
air transportation and scheduling.42 
It is well established that Congress retains power to implement 
preemption provisions pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, which 
provides that states are bound by the laws of the United States.43  
Accordingly, federal law trumps state law when the two are in conflict 
because the laws of the United States are “the [S]upreme Law of the 
Land.”44  Preemption is important because it “allocat[es] governing 
                                                                                                             
“Services” generally represent a bargained-for or anticipated provision 
of labor from one party to another.  If the element of bargain or 
agreement is incorporated in our understanding of services, it leads to 
a concern with the contractual arrangement between the airline and 
the user of the service.  Elements of the air carrier service bargain 
include items such as ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food 
and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the transportation 
itself.  These matters are all appurtenant and necessarily included with 
the contract of carriage between the passenger or shipper and the 
airline.  It is these [contractual] features of air transportation that we 
believe Congress intended to de-regulate as “services” and broadly to 
protect from state regulation. 
Id. (quoting Hodges, 44 F.3d at 354). 
42 See Duncan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 208 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (accepting 
the narrow definition of “services”).  Services pertain to “‘the frequency and scheduling of 
transportation, [or] the selection of markets to or from which transportation is provided.’”  
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 
1265–66 (9th Cir. 1998)); Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265–66 (rejecting the broad definition of 
services and replacing it with a narrow definition).  Charas stated that: 
Airlines’ “rates” and “routes” generally refer to the point-to-point 
transport of passengers.  “Rates” indicates price; “routes” refers to 
courses of travel.  It therefore follows that “service,” when juxtaposed 
to “rates” and “routes,” refers to such things as the frequency and 
scheduling of transportation, and to the selection of markets to or from 
which transportation is provided (as in, “This airline provides service 
from Tucson to New York twice a day.”)  To interpret “service” more 
broadly is to ignore the context of its use; and, it effectively would 
result in the preemption of virtually everything an airline does.  It 
seems clear to us that that is not what Congress intended. 
Id. 
43 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.  The Supremacy Clause states that “the Laws of the 
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”  Id.; see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 1297 (defining 
preemption as “[t]he principle (derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can 
supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation”). 
44 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; see Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. 
Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass., 507 U.S. 218, 224 (1993) (“Consideration under 
the Supremacy Cause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to 
displace state law.” (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981))); Gade v. 
Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (discussing when state law must 
yield to federal law).  “[A]ny State law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged 
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authority between the federal and state governments.”45  Federal 
preemption of state law can occur one of two ways:  (1) where federal 
law expressly preempts state law; and (2) where preemption is implied 
by a clear congressional intent to preempt state law.46  Express 
preemption occurs when Congress explicitly states its command in the 
statute’s language, such as with a preemption provision.47  Implied 
preemption occurs when the Congressional command is implicitly 
                                                                                                             
power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.”  Id. (quoting Felder 
v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); De Canas v. Bica, 424 
U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (explaining that state law must give way to federal law even when it 
encompasses important state interests).  “[E]ven state regulation designed to protect vital 
state interests must give way to paramount federal legislation.”  Id. 
45 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 395 (3rd ed. 
2006); see Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (discussing the importance of respecting 
the States, even in areas that are heavily regulated such as the FDA). 
46 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 393; see Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (explaining principles of 
preemption).  The Court explained: 
Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and “is compelled 
whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s 
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.”  Absent 
explicit preemptive language, we have recognized at least two types of 
implied pre-emption:  field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal 
regulation is “‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,’” and conflict 
pre-emption, where “compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility,” or where state law “stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.” 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) 
(explaining that state law is preempted when it “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”); Gabriel F. Siegle, 
Switching Tracks:  Complete Preemption Removal and the Railway Labor Act, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1107, 1121 (2007) (discussing complete preemption).  The complete preemption doctrine 
“permits the removal of claims from state court, pleaded in terms of state law, under a 
limited set of circumstances.”  Id.  When the preemptive force of a statute is “so powerful as 
to displace entirely any state cause of action,” then the “claim arises under federal law, 
[and] falls within the removal jurisdiction of a federal court.”  Id.  There are only three 
statutes that have been identified as having complete preemption:  the Labor Management 
Relations Act, Employment Retirement Income Security Act, and the National Bank Act.  
Id. 
47 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98; see Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) 
(“The question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and we accordingly begin with the 
language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that 
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 396–401 (discussing express preemption).  
“[E]ven if there is statutory language expressly preempting state law, Congress rarely is 
clear about the scope of what is preempted . . . and this inevitably is an inquiry into 
congressional intent.”  Id. at 393. 
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contained in its structure and purpose.48  Determining congressional 
intent is necessary in both express and implied preemption.49  Generally, 
police powers of the states are not to be preempted unless there is a 
“clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”50  There is a presumption 
against preemption when historic police powers of the states are at issue 
because states are respected by the Federal Government as “independent 
sovereigns in our federal system, [which] leads us to assume that 
                                                 
48 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.  The Court looks at congressional intent to determine preemption.  
Id.; see Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194–95 (2009) (discussing the foundation of preemption 
jurisprudence).  There are two main principles in our preemption jurisprudence.  Id. at 
1194–95.  “First, ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption 
case.’”  Id. at 1194 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).  The second 
principle is “the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”  Id. at 1194–95 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 393 (“[I]mplied preemption is often a function of 
both perceived congressional intent and the language used in the statute or regulation.”). 
49 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 393 (discussing congressional intent in express and 
implied preemption).  The Court must determine congressional intent in both express and 
implied preemption.  Id.  The problem is that Congress almost never clearly or expressly 
states its intent regarding the scope of preemption.  Id. at 394.  The Court is often left to 
discern congressional intent by using “fragments of statutory language, random statements 
in the legislative history, and the degree of detail of the federal regulation.”  Id. 
50 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  Historic police powers of the 
states are not to be preempted without a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  Id.  
The Court explained: 
Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways.  The scheme of 
federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.  
Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest 
is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.  Likewise, the object 
sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of 
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.  Or the state 
policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the 
federal statute.  It is often a perplexing question whether Congress has 
precluded state action or by the choice of selective regulatory measures 
has left the police power of the States undisturbed except as the state 
and federal regulations collide. 
Id. at 230–31 (citations omitted); see N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 
413 (1973) (observing that Congress should clearly state its intention regarding the 
preemption of state laws).  “The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be 
presumed.”  Id. (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202–03 (1952)); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 1276 (defining police power).  A police power is “[t]he 
inherent and plenary power of a sovereign to make all laws necessary and proper to 
preserve the public security, order, health, morality, and justice.”  Id.  States have a “Tenth 
Amendment right . . . to establish and enforce laws protecting the public’s health, safety, 
and general welfare, or to delegate this right to local governments.”  Id. 
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Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of action.”51  
Congress expressly exercised its Supremacy Clause power to implement 
the ADA’s preemption provision and preempt state law from interfering 
with the newly deregulated airline industry, but it was unclear regarding 
its meaning of “service.”52 
C. Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the ADA’s Preemption Provision 
Two Supreme Court cases have interpreted the language of the 
ADA’s express preemption provision.53  The first case was Morales v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., decided in 1992.54  The issue in Morales was 
whether the states were preempted from enforcing their general 
consumer protection statutes to prohibit allegedly deceptive airline fare 
advertisements.55  The Court began its analysis by looking to the 
language of the statute itself.56  As noted, the statute “expressly 
preempt[ed] the states from ‘enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law, rule, 
regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of 
law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier . . . .’”57  The 
                                                 
51 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1195 n.3 (quoting Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (discussing the presumption against preemption).  Furthermore, 
the Court stated that the presumption “accounts for the historic presence of state law,” and 
it may apply in areas that are heavily regulated by the federal government.  Id.  Therefore, 
the absence of federal regulation is not required for the presumption to apply.  Id. 
52 See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s power under the 
Supremacy Clause); supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (explaining how courts have 
adopted different definitions of “service”). 
53 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995) (interpreting the preemption 
provision under the ADA and elaborating on the standards set forth in Morales); Morales v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (interpreting the ADA’s preemption 
provision for the first time). 
54 504 U.S. 374 (1992). 
55 Id. at 378.  In 1987, the National Association of Attorneys General adopted Air Travel 
Industry Enforcement Guidelines.  Id. at 379.  These guidelines contained specific standards 
that governed “the content and format of airline advertising, the awarding of premiums to 
regular customers (so-called ‘frequent flyers’), and the payment of compensation to 
passengers who voluntarily yield their seats on overbooked flights.”  Id.  These guidelines 
did not attempt to create new laws or regulations in the airline industry.  Id.  Rather, they 
explained “how existing state laws appl[ied] to air fare advertising and frequent flyer 
programs.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The attorneys general of seven states 
notified major airlines that they were in violation of the guidelines.  Id.  Airlines filed suit in 
federal district court claiming that the state regulation of fare advertisements is preempted 
by the ADA.  Id at 380. 
56 Morales, 504 U.S. at 383.  The Court “[began] with the language employed by Congress 
and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the 
legislative purpose.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57 Morales, 504 U.S. at 383 (alteration in original) (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1)).  
The preemption provision was reenacted and reworded in 1994.  Airline Deregulation Act, 
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2006).  The current wording of the ADA preemption provision is 
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Supreme Court focused on the phrase “relating to.”58  The Court 
determined that the ordinary meaning of “relating to” is broad; 
therefore, the provision serves a broad preemptive purpose.59 
The Court analogized the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”) cases, where it had interpreted the “‘relates to’” an employee 
benefit plan language as “‘if it has a connection with, or reference to, 
such a plan.’”60  The Morales Court adopted this standard.61  As a result, 
state laws, regulations, or other provisions are preempted if they have a 
connection with or reference to airline “rates, routes, or services.”62  The 
Court further explained that certain state laws may not be preempted if 
they affect the scope of the statute in “too tenuous, remote, or peripheral 
a manner.”63 
The Supreme Court also applied ERISA precedent to reach its 
holding that the ADA preemption provision preempts both state laws 
                                                                                                             
the following:  a state “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision 
having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that 
may provide air transportation under this subpart.”  § 41713(b)(1); see Wolens, 513 U.S. at 
223 n.1 (explaining that no substantive changes were intended by Congress when it revised 
the preemption provision). 
58 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383 (“[T]he key phrase, obviously, is ‘relating to.’”). 
59 Id. at 383–84.  The Court explained that “[t]he ordinary meaning of these words is a 
broad one . . . and the words thus express a broad pre-emptive purpose.”  Id. at 383.  
“‘[R]elating to’ [means] . . . ‘to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to 
pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.’”  Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979)). 
60 Morales, 504 U.S. at 384.  The ERISA preemption clause stated that all state laws are 
superseded “insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”  
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006); see Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983) 
(“The breadth of [the provision’s] pre-emptive reach is apparent from [its] language.”).  
The Court defined “relates to” in ERISA’s preemption provision as “ha[ving] a connection 
with or reference to such a plan.”  Id. at 96–97; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 
U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (stating that ERISA’s preemption provision is “deliberately expansive, 
and designed to ‘establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern’”). 
61 Morales, 504 U.S. at 384.  The language in the ADA’s preemption provision was 
identical to the language in ERISA’s preemption provision.  Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) 
(showing the similarly worded preemption provision of ERISA). 
62 Morales, 504 U.S. at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Since the relevant 
language of the ADA is identical, we think it appropriate to adopt the same standard here:  
State enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to airline ‘rates, routes, or 
services’ are pre-empted under 49 U.S.C.App [sic] § 1305(a)(1).”  Id. 
63 Id. at 390.  Examples of laws that would be “far more tenuous” than the law addressed 
in Morales are state laws concerning “nonprice aspects of fare advertising.”  Id.  The Court 
stated that the “saving clause” does not adversely affect the preemption provision because 
it is merely a relic of the pre-ADA era that lacked a preemption provision.  Id. at 384–85.  In 
statutory construction, the specific governs the general; therefore, a general saving clause 
protecting state remedies cannot be allowed to trump a specific substantive preemption 
provision.  Id.  “[W]e do not believe Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn 
statute through a general saving clause.”  Id. at 385 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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specifically addressed to the airline industry and laws of general 
applicability that may have an indirect effect.64  Additionally, the Court 
held that the ADA’s preemption provision preempted all state laws that 
fall within its scope, including state laws that are consistent with the 
provision.65  Thus, the Supreme Court held that the fare advertising 
provisions in Morales were preempted by the ADA.66 
In the second case, American Airlines v. Wolens, the Supreme Court 
interpreted “relating to rates, routes, or services” as meaning states 
cannot impose their own public policies, regulation, or competition 
theories on airline operations.67  In Wolens, the airline modified the terms 
and conditions of its frequent flyer program and applied it 
retroactively.68  Customers who earned credits prior to the modification 
of the frequent flyer program were disadvantaged because their credits 
                                                 
64 See id. at 386 (explaining the petitioner’s argument against preemption).  The 
petitioner argued that laws of general applicability were not preempted by the ADA.  Id.  
The only laws preempted were state laws specifically tailored to the airline industry.  Id.  
The Court disagreed with this notion; it completely ignored the broad “relating to” 
language.  Id.  Furthermore, the Court reasoned that they “have consistently rejected this 
precise argument in [their] ERISA cases:  ‘[A] state law may ‘relate to’ a benefit plan, and 
thereby be pre-empted, even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such plans, or 
the effect is only indirect.’”  Id. 
65 See id. at 387 (addressing the argument that state laws should not be preempted when 
they are consistent with federal law).  The statute’s language does not suggest that its 
preemption is limited to inconsistent state regulation.  Id. 
66 Id. at 391.  The Court explained that state restrictions on fare advertising have a direct 
effect on airline fares.  Id. at 388.  Advertising informs the public of prices and services, 
thereby performing a role in the allocation of resources.  Id.  State restrictions on 
advertising increases the difficulty of finding the lowest cost seller and thus reduces the 
incentive to price competitively.  Id.; see Ill. Corporate Travel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 
751, 754 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that “[p]rice advertising surely ‘relates to’ price,” as stated 
by Judge Easterbrook). 
67 513 U.S. 219, 229 n.5 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Wolens Court also 
interpreted other terms and phrases from the preemption provision such as “‘enforce,’” 
“‘enact,’” and “‘having the force and effect of law.’”  Id.  The Court stated that the words 
“‘enforce”” and “‘enact’” “‘could [ ] be read to preempt even state-court enforcement of 
private contracts.’”  Id.  However, the phrase “‘law, rule, regulation, standard, or other 
provision’” indicates “‘official, government-imposed policies, not the terms of a private 
contract.’”  Id.  The Court further explained that the phrase “‘having the force and effect of 
law’” is most naturally read to “‘refe[r] to binding standards of conduct that operate 
irrespective of any private agreement.’”  Id. 
68 Id. at 225.  Plaintiffs participated in Amercian Airlines’ frequent flyer program called 
AAdvantage, which gave participants an opportunity to earn mileage credits when they 
flew American.  Id. at 224.  The mileage credits could be exchanged for airline tickets or 
class upgrades.  Id.  American made modifications to the AAdvantage program and 
applied them retroactively.  Id. at 225. 
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were devalued.69  The Court held that the state consumer fraud act claim 
was preempted, but the state law breach of contract claim was not.70  The 
Court determined that the purpose of the ADA was to leave the selection 
and design of marketing mechanisms to the airline industry and not to 
the states.71  Therefore, the consumer fraud claim, which related to 
“rates” and affected the airlines’ marketing scheme, was preempted by 
the ADA’s preemption clause.72  In regards to the state law breach of 
contract claim, the Court explained that the ADA’s preemption clause, 
when read with the “savings clause,” allowed states to afford relief to a 
party who claimed and proved that an airline dishonored a term that it 
stipulated.73 
Ultimately, Morales and Wolens established the test for determining 
preemption under the ADA.74  A state law is preempted by the ADA’s 
preemption provision if it “relates to airline rates, routes, or services, 
either by expressly referring to them or by having a significant economic 
effect upon them.”75 
                                                 
69 Id. at 224–25.  Plaintiffs brought suit against the airline claiming that the cutbacks 
violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted 
a breach of contract.  Id. at 225. 
70 Id. at 222.  The remedy sought for the breach of contract claim merely holds the parties 
to their agreement.  Id. at 229.  Furthermore, holding that the ADA permits state law breach 
of contract claims “makes sense of Congress’ retention of the FAA’s saving clause.”  Id. at 
232. 
71 Id. at 228. 
72 Id.  States are stopped from “imposing their own substantive standards with respect to 
rates, routes, or services.”  Id. at 232. 
73 Id. at 232–33.  The Court did “not read the ADA’s preemption clause . . . to shelter 
airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery 
solely for the airline’s alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings.”  Id. at 228.  
The terms and conditions offered by airlines, and accepted by passengers, are “privately 
ordered obligations ‘and thus do not amount to a State’s enact[ment] or enforce[ment] [of] 
any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law 
within the meaning of [the ADA’s preemption provision].’”  Id. at 228–29 (alteration in 
original). 
74 See supra notes 54–66 and accompanying text (explaining how Morales established the 
test to determine preemption under the ADA); supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text 
(illustrating how Wolens applied the Morales test); see also Wolens, 513 U.S. at 234–35 
(explaining that the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision is too complicated to be 
settled by two Supreme Court cases).  “[W]hile we adhere to our holding in Morales, we do 
not overlook that in our system of adjudication, principles seldom can be settled ‘on the 
basis of one or two cases . . . .’”  Id. 
75 Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1432 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (clearly stating the test established by the 
Supreme Court in Morales and Wolens). 
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D. The WPP 
After the Supreme Court interpreted the ADA’s preemption 
provision, the enactment of the WPP complicated the analysis.76  For 
many years, the aviation industry lacked a federal whistleblower statute 
to protect airline employees.77  In 2000, Congress enacted the Wendell H. 
Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (“AIR 
21”) to improve airline safety.78  AIR 21 included a federal whistleblower 
protection program providing uniform whistleblower protection to 
airline employees for the first time.79  Thus, the ADA was amended to 
                                                 
76 See supra Part II.A–C (explaining the purpose behind the ADA and its preemption 
provision and discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA’s preemption 
provision). 
77 See Peter R. Marksteiner, The Flying Whistleblower:  It’s Time for Federal Statutory 
Protection for Aviation Industry Workers, 25 J. LEGIS. 39, 39 (1999) (discussing the need for a 
federal whistleblower statute).  Employees in the aviation industry were not completely 
unprotected from whistleblower retaliation; however, they did not enjoy a federal 
whistleblower statute.  Id.  A federal whistleblower statute was necessary to encourage 
airline employees to report violations without fear of retaliation.  Id.  The FAA is in charge 
of monitoring and enforcing safety standards in the aviation industry.  Id. at 40.  Since the 
demand for regional and commuter airlines has catapulted, “[t]he FAA has turned to the 
carriers themselves to monitor their own compliance with FAA standards under what is 
referred to as the ‘Safety Partnership’ program.”  Id. at 39.  Like other agencies, the FAA 
has limited resources and a fixed budget.  Id. at 40.  Airline employees are in the best 
situation to discover and report safety violations.  Id. at 39.  However, without federal 
statutory protection for aviation whistleblowers, employees in the airline industry will not  
come forward with violations due to fear of reprisal.  Id. at 73; Rita Murphy, OSHA, AIR21 
and Whistleblower Protection for Aviation Workers, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 901, 910 (2004) 
[hereinafter OHSA, AIR 21 and Whistleblower Protection] (“Congress began seriously 
contemplating a whistleblower protection program in the late 1990s after a string of 
commercial passenger plane crashes pushed safety concerns to the forefront.”). 
78 Whistleblower Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2006); see AVIATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 203 (discussing the enactment of AIR21); Marksteiner, 
supra note 77, at 50 (discussing the relationship between airline safety and statutory 
whistleblower protection).  The author explained that if people felt free to report violations 
without fear of reprisal, the violations would be corrected and the safety risks would be 
eliminated.  Id. 
79 49 U.S.C. § 42121; see 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (explaining that the objective of the 
WPP was to provide whistleblower protection to airline employees to encourage violation 
reporting and ensure safety); AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 206; 
Marksteiner, supra note 77, at 52 (discussing how “[t]he FAA relies on voluntary reporting 
by airline employees to compile and track much of the data it needs in order to perform its 
safety function”).  The author stated: 
[R]eliance on front-line employees to report violations of laws or rules 
is an indispensable asset to regulatory agencies whose ability to 
regulate effectively is limited by finite resources.  The benefits from 
those front-line employees are potentially lost if they must choose 
between reporting essential information to the FAA and the possibility 
of losing their jobs. . . . Workers need the protections offered by this 
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include the WPP.80  The WPP provided a federal cause of action for 
employees that protected them from retaliatory termination or 
discrimination for reporting violations or alleged violations to the FAA 
or the company itself.81  The WPP did not include an express preemption 
provision, did not reference preemption in any way, and did not indicate 
that it was an expansion of the preemption clause in the ADA.82 
Under the WPP, an employee may not directly file a civil action in 
federal court against his employer.83  Pursuant to the statute, an 
employee is required to go through an administrative complaint and 
investigation process with the DOL.84  First, he must file a complaint 
with the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”).85  Then, the Secretary assesses 
                                                                                                             
law if they are expected to act as an extension of the FAA’s safety 
inspection component. 
Id. at 53–54. 
80 49 U.S.C. § 42121; see Buckman, supra note 38, § 2 (discussing the history of the ADA 
and the WPP). 
81 49 U.S.C. § 42121; see Marksteiner, supra note 77, at 51 (explaining the important role 
airline employees play in reporting safety violations to the FAA and the need to protect 
these employees from retaliation).  The author explained: 
[I]n the aviation industry, the FAA recognizes that employee 
participation is essential to implement the FAA policy of insuring that 
air travel is as safe as possible for the traveling public. . . . [T]he FAA 
will not be adequately able to enforce its safety policy unless the 
workers upon whom the FAA relies are confident they can report 
violations without fear of reprisal. 
Id. 
82 49 U.S.C. § 42121; see Buckman, supra note 38, § 2 (stating that the WPP “contains no 
reference to preemption and no indication that it altered or added anything to the ADA’s 
preemption provisions”). 
83 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(1).  The complaint procedure under the WPP states that “[a] 
person who believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against 
by any person in violation of [49 § 42121(a)] may . . .  file (or have any person file on his or 
her behalf) a complaint with the Secretary . . . .”  Id. 
84 Id. § 42121(b).  A person who believes that he has been retaliated against in violation 
of the WPP may file a complaint with the Secretary “not later than 90 days after the date on 
which such violation occurr[ed].”  Id. § 42121(b)(1); see Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 
342 F.3d 1248, 1261 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining the process of going through the DOL 
under the WPP); AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 206 (“The time limit for 
employees to make such complaints in writing to the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration is 90 days from the date of each adverse employment action.”). 
85 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(1).  Upon receiving the complaint, the Secretary will “notify, in 
writing, the person named in the complaint and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration of the filing of the complaint, of the allegations contained in the complaint, 
of the substance of evidence supporting the complaint, and of the opportunities that will be 
afforded to such person.”  Id.  The Secretary shall afford the person named in the complaint 
an opportunity to submit a written response to the complaint and an opportunity to meet 
with a representative of the Secretary to present statements from witnesses.  Id. 
§ 42121(b)(2)(A); see supra notes 83–85 and infra notes 86–88 (discussing the procedures 
under the WPP). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 [2011], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss1/7
2011] Ready for Takeoff? 229 
the merits of the employee’s complaint and either denies it or finds it 
meritorious.86  If the Secretary finds that the employee was terminated or 
discharged for reporting a violation or an alleged violation, an 
abatement of the violation can be ordered, and the employee may be 
reinstated and awarded back pay and compensatory damages.87  Either 
party may obtain review of the Secretary’s order in the circuit court of 
appeals if he is unsatisfied with the outcome.88 
AIR 21’s WPP is one of seventeen whistleblower statutes that the 
DOL is responsible for.89  The limited number of resources, increasing 
caseload, and the statute’s complexity has resulted in lengthy delays in 
                                                 
86 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(A).  Within 60 days of receiving the complaint and allowing 
the employer to answer, “the [Secretary] shall conduct an investigation and determine 
whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the complaint has merit.”  Id.  The 
Secretary shall “notify, in writing, the complainant and the person alleged to have 
committed a violation of subsection (a) of the Secretary’s findings.  Id.  “If the [Secretary] 
concludes that there is a reasonable cause to believe that a violation of [49 § 42121(a)] has 
occurred, the Secretary shall accompany the Secretary’s findings with a preliminary order 
providing the relief.”  Id.  “The [Secretary] shall dismiss a complaint . . . and shall not 
conduct an investigation . . . unless the complainant makes a prima facie showing that any 
behavior described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a) was a contributing factor 
in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint.”  Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(i).  The 
Secretary may not order relief “if the employer demonstrates, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in 
the absence of that behavior.” Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
87 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(3)(B).  The statute states: 
If, in response to a complaint filed under paragraph (1), the [Secretary] 
determines that a violation of subsection (a) has occurred, the 
[Secretary] shall order the person who committed such violation to— 
(i) take affirmative action to abate the violation; 
(ii) reinstate the complainant to his or her former position together 
with the compensation (including back pay) and restore the terms, 
conditions, and privileges associated with his or her employment; and 
(iii) provide compensatory damages to the complainant. 
Id. 
88 Id. § 42121(b)(4)(A).  The statute further states: 
Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order issued under 
[the WPP] may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the circuit in which the violation, with respect to which the 
order was issued, allegedly occurred or the circuit in which the 
complainant resided on the date of such violation.  The petition for 
review must be filed not later than 60 days after the date of the 
issuance of the final order of the [Secretary]. 
Id. 
89 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-106, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 
PROGRAM:  BETTER DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT WOULD HELP ENSURE PROGRAM 
QUALITY AND CONSISTENCY 1, 7 (2009) (explaining the several whistleblower statutes that 
the DOL is responsible for). 
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the investigation process.90  Generally, investigations exceed the 
statutory time frame allowed for the investigation.91  In addition to 
lengthy investigations, the employees are only successful in a minority of 
the cases.92  For example, employees had successful outcomes in about 
nineteen percent of the 1,800 cases in 2007.93  Appeals are also delayed 
and relatively unsuccessful; about one-third or fewer of the appeals 
result in outcomes that favor the employee.94 
Thus, AIR 21 established the WPP, which provided airline 
employees with the option of bringing a federal whistleblower claim 
against their employer for retaliatory discharge.95  Subsequently, airline 
employees had uniform federal whistleblower protection; however, the 
process was delayed and employees were successful in a minority of the 
cases.96 
E. The Circuit Split 
Prior to enactment of the WPP, airline employees could only bring 
state whistleblower claims.97  Several airline employees brought state 
                                                 
90 See id. at 2, 4.  OSHA has about sixty-nine investigators, eight supervisory 
investigators, and one program manager assigned to enforcing seventeen whistleblower 
statutes, and there are roughly 1,800 whistleblower complaints that they must investigate.  
Id. at 2.  In addition, “caseloads are increasing at all levels.”  Id. at 3.  “[D]ue to the addition 
of several new statutes, investigators are carrying larger, more complex caseloads.”  Id. at 6.  
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) “found that completion of any one phase 
of an investigation—opening, information gathering, or closing—sometimes took longer 
than the overall statutory or regulatory time frame for the entire investigation.”  Id. at 4.  
Complexity of the cases affects the length of the investigation process.  Id.  Many 
investigators reported that “they lack some of the resources they need to do their jobs, 
including equipment, training, and legal assistance.”  Id. at 5.  For instance, almost half of 
the investigators in the government’s survey stated that AIR21’s WPP was one of the most 
complex statutes to enforce, and they did not receive any specific training for this statute.  
Id. at 6. 
91 See id. at 17.  The GAO found that investigations for whistleblower statutes that have a 
sixty-day time frame could take up to 320 days to complete.  Id.  The WPP has a statutory 
time frame of sixty days.  49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(A). 
92 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 89, at 26 (explaining the small 
percentage of outcomes that favor the employee). 
93 See id. (following necessary adjustments, GAO found that sixty-five percent of the 
whistleblower complaints were dismissed, seventeen percent withdrawn, and nineteen 
percent found to have merit). 
94 See id. at 5. 
95 See supra Part II.D (introducing the federal remedy enacted for airline employees who 
blow the whistle). 
96 See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (discussing the delays with the 
investigation process and low success rates). 
97 See Marksteiner, supra note 77, at 39 (discussing the need for a federal whistleblower 
statute).  At the time of this article, most employees enjoyed some form of federal 
whistleblower protection, but not airline employees.  Id.; see also  OHSA, AIR 21 and 
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retaliatory discharge claims against their employers after the ADA’s 
preemption provision was in place, but before enactment of the WPP.98  
Notably, a majority of the courts found that these claims were not 
preempted by the ADA.99  The courts applied the Morales test, which 
questioned whether the law related to “rates, routes, or services of an air 
carrier.”100  Most courts have held that state whistleblower claims were 
                                                                                                             
Whistleblower Protection, supra note 77, at 910 (discussing how the airline industry was 
opposed to federal statutory protection).  Many people in the airline industry believed that 
airline employees had adequate recourse and federal statutory protection was not 
necessary.  Id.  Furthermore, most airlines believed the FAA was successfully monitoring 
safety and a whistleblower protection program for airline employees was “intrusive and 
unnecessary.”  Id. 
98 See Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 598 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that 
Congress did not clearly intend the ADA’s preemption provision to preempt state law 
claims for retaliation); Espinosa v. Cont’l Airlines, 80 F. Supp. 2d 297, 302 (D.N.J. 2000) (“It 
cannot be stated that Congress clearly intended for a plaintiff’s state law claim for 
retaliatory discharge to be preempted by the [ADA].”); Ruggiero v. AMR, Corp., No. C94-
20160JW, 1995 WL 549010, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1995) (“It is not reasonable to believe 
that retaliatory discharge claims have a ‘connection with or reference to’ air carrier 
services.”).  Any effect they may have on services “is far ‘too tenuous, remote or peripheral’ 
to have pre-emptive effect.”  Id.; see also Anderson v. Evergreen Int’l Airlines, Inc., 886 P.2d 
1068, 1071 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the relationship between the aircraft mechanic’s 
wrongful discharge claim and “services” was “‘too tenuous, remote, or peripheral’” to be 
preempted by the ADA). 
99 See Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 
various cases that held the preemption clause of the ADA did not include retaliatory 
discharge claims); Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 597 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding 
that any effect the retaliatory discharge claim may have on American Airline’s services was 
“far too remote to trigger pre-emption” and thus was not preempted by the ADA); 
Espinosa, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (holding that the state whistleblower claim was “‘too 
tenuous, remote, or peripheral’” to be preempted by the ADA).  “Although the Court’s 
holding in Morales appeared to suggest a broad interpretation of the ‘related to’ phrase, the 
Court also cautioned that the ADA’s preemptive sweep was not unlimited and did not 
preempt state actions that were ‘too tenuous, remote, or peripheral.’”  Id.; see also Ruggiero, 
1995 WL 549010, at *9 (holding that the ADA does not preempt a claim for retaliatory 
discharge), Anderson v. Evergreen Int’l Airlines, Inc., 886 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Or. Ct. App. 
1994) (holding that the aircraft mechanic’s wrongful discharge claim was not preempted by 
the ADA).  But see Marlow v. AMR Servs. Corp., 870 F. Supp. 295, 299 (D. Haw. 1994) 
(holding that the aircraft mechanic’s state whistleblower claim was preempted by the 
ADA). 
100 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (establishing the test 
for determining whether a state claim is preempted by the ADA); Air Carrier’s Services, 
supra note 40, at 1197–98 (explaining the different interpretations courts have adopted 
regarding the term “service” in the ADA preemption provision).  Courts have not been 
able to derive a uniform definition of the term “service” under the ADA.  Id. at 1198.  For 
example: 
One interpretation is that ‘service’ means air services, involving only 
actual transportation and its frequency and scheduling.  If the term is 
given this narrow definition, express preemption can never occur with 
regard to the other various services the airlines provide.  In contrast, 
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“too tenuous, remote, or peripheral” and thus fell outside the scope of 
preemption.101 
Subsequent to enactment of the WPP, airline employees continued to 
pursue state remedies.102  The circuits took opposing views as to whether 
the WPP preempted state whistleblower claims:  (1) the Eighth Circuit 
held that the WPP expressly preempted state whistleblower claims by 
expanding the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision; and (2) the 
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits held that the WPP did not expand 
the preemption provision’s scope, thus the only analysis was whether 
the claim fell within the scope of the ADA’s preemption clause.103 
                                                                                                             
“service” can also include airline services beyond transportation, such 
as flight attendant services, overhead compartment storage, and 
boarding procedures.  If the term is given this broad definition, the 
statute can preempt all of these other areas if the state regulations have 
the requisite connection to them. 
Id. at 1197–98 (footnotes omitted). 
101 See supra notes 98–99 (illustrating the numerous cases that have held retaliatory 
discharge claims do not fall within the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision); see also 
Katrina Maher, Note, Preemption—The Preemptive Scope of the Airline Deregulation Act as 
Amended by the Whistleblower Protection Program:  Wright v. Nordam Group, Inc., 74 J. AIR L. 
& COM. 113, 118–19 (2009) (explaining that Congress must have been aware that the 
majority of courts held that state law whistleblower claims were not preempted by the 
ADA before the enactment of the WPP). 
102 See Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower 
Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 621 (1999) (explaining why employees prefer to bring 
state whistleblower claims, even after a federal remedy is available).  Most state 
whistleblower statutes rely on judicial redress as opposed to an administrative process; 
thus, employees who wish to have their day in court bring state remedies.  Id. 
103 See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) (following the 
Branche view); Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 189–90 (3d Cir. 2005) (following the 
Branche court’s reasoning); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64 (holding that the WPP’s 
preemption clause is not altered or expanded by the WPP); see also Maher, supra note 101, at 
114 (discussing the new issue of whether the WPP expands the scope of the ADA’s 
preemption provision).  The author discussed: 
[F]or the first twenty-two years following passage of the ADA, if a 
state law whistleblower claim was not related to the services of an 
airline, the claim was not expressly preempted by [the ADA].  
However, when Congress enacted the WPP and created a federal 
whistleblower cause of action, the courts were forced to address the 
issue of whether Congress intended to expand the preemptive scope of 
[the ADA] such that all state law whistleblower claims falling within 
the WPP’s scope are preempted. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); cf. Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 498 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that the WPP expands the scope of the WPP’s preemption provision). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 [2011], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss1/7
2011] Ready for Takeoff? 233 
1. Eighth Circuit’s Position:  The WPP Expanded the Scope of the 
ADA’s Preemption Provision 
In Botz v. Omni Air International in 2002, the Eighth Circuit, in a case 
of first impression, held that the ADA, as amended by the federal WPP, 
expressly preempted the flight attendant’s claim under the state 
whistleblower statute.104  The court began its analysis by assessing the 
purpose of Congress and the ordinary meaning of the statutory 
language.105 
First, the court determined whether the scope of the preemption 
clause encompassed the flight attendant’s claim.106  The court applied the 
test from Morales; thus, Botz’s state whistleblower claim was preempted 
by the ADA if it had “a connection with or reference to airline ‘rates, 
routes, or services.’”107  The court held that the Minnesota whistleblower 
statute fell within the scope of the preemption provision because it 
indirectly affected “services.”108 
                                                 
104 Botz, 286 F.3d at 498.  “While the plain language of the ADA’s pre-emption provision 
encompasses Botz’s claims, the WPP makes it unmistakable that such claims are pre-
empted and dispels whatever doubt might possibly linger after a plain-language analysis 
of the ADA’s pre-emption provision.”  Id.  In Botz, a flight attendant refused a flight 
assignment that was round-trip from Alaska to Japan because she believed it violated the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (“FARs”).  Id. at 490.  Omni allegedly terminated her in 
retaliation of her refusal.  Id.  Botz brought a claim under the Minnesota whistleblower 
statute, and the case was removed to the federal court.  Id. at 490–91.  The Botz court had to 
determine whether the flight attendant’s state whistleblower claim was preempted by the 
ADA and whether the WPP expanded the preemption clause of the ADA.  Id. at 491. 
105 Id. at 491–92.  Preemption is not taken lightly in the employment law area because it 
“‘falls within the traditional police power of the State.’”  Id. at 493.  However, where 
Congress has given a clear intent for preemption, the state’s police powers may be 
superseded.  Id. 
106 Id. at 491–92.  Theories of implied preemption are usually not considered when 
Congress has placed an express preemption clause in the enacted legislation.  Id. at 493. 
107 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (establishing the test 
for determining what is preempted by the ADA’s preemption clause).  State enforcement 
actions having “a connection with, or reference to airline ‘rates, routes, or services’” are 
expressly preempted by the ADA.  Id.; see also Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 
228 n.5 (1995) (discussing the Morales test).  The Wolens court stated that this “is most 
sensibly read, in light of the ADA’s overarching deregulatory purpose, to mean ‘States may 
not seek to impose their own public policies or theories of competition or regulation on the 
operations of an air carrier.’”  Id. 
108 Botz, 286 F.3d at 492, 496–97.  Botz argued that her claims are protected from 
preemption by the saving clause in the ADA; however, the court disagreed and found the 
saving clause to be merely a general remedies clause that “is a relic of the pre-ADA/no 
pre-emption regime.”  Id. at 491 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 385).  Furthermore, the 
Morales Court already held that the general saving clause cannot undermine the effect of 
the express, specific preemption clause.  Morales, 504 U.S. at 385. 
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Botz relied on cases decided prior to the WPP, when there was no 
equivalent federal cause of action available.109  The Eighth Circuit 
reasoned that the WPP provided protection to airline employees who 
were discriminated against or discharged for reporting safety-related 
violations, which evidenced that Congress had a “clear and manifest 
intent to [preempt state law] whistleblower claims related to air 
safety.”110  Thus, the enactment of the WPP and the protections it 
provides airline employees encompasses “the types of claims [that] 
Congress intended the ADA to [preempt].”111  Congress created a single, 
uniform standard to deal with air-safety violation complaints and 
furthered its goal of market force reliance by not allowing such 
complaints to be determined by fragmented, inconsistent state 
regulation.112 
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Congress was aware of the ADA, 
its express preemption provision, and its broad application.113  Further, 
                                                 
109 Botz, 286 F.3d at 496, 496 n.8.  Botz further argued that her claims were too tenuously 
and remotely connected to “prices, routes, or services” to be preempted.  Id. at 496.  Botz 
relied on a number of cases that “held certain [state law] employment discrimination 
claims to be too remote or tenuously related to air-carrier prices, routes, and services to be 
pre-empted.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  The court found the cases it relied on to be 
distinguishable because they did not involve a state law that gave an airline employee the 
right to refuse an assignment essential to an airline’s “services,” and none of them involved 
an application of state law that regulates the same principles as the WPP.  Id. 
110 Id.; see Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (explaining 
“the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be 
superseded . . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress” (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 U.S. 218, 
230 (1947) (explaining that there must be a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” for a 
Federal Act to supersede traditional police powers of the states). 
111 Botz, 286 F.3d at 497.  By establishing a uniform remedy for aviation employees who 
are retaliated against for reporting safety violations, Congress has “furthered its goal of 
ensuring that the price, availability, and efficiency of air transportation rely primarily upon 
market forces and competition.”  Id. 
112 Id.  Furthermore, Congress provided a review system where an unsatisfied party can 
appeal to the federal courts of appeals for review, making the process uniform across the 
nation.  Id.; cf. Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 373 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing 
how safety is a necessity for airlines and not a factor when competing with other airlines).  
“Safe operations . . . are a necessity for all airlines.  Whether or not to conform to safety 
standards is not an option for airlines in choosing a mode of competition.”  Id. 
113 Botz, 286 F.3d at 497.  Botz argued that the WPP was not intended to preempt state 
whistleblower statutes, because Congress did not include an express preemption provision 
when it easily could have.  Id.  The Botz court thinks this argument “turns the proper logic 
on its head.”  Id.  The court reasoned: 
When it fashioned the WPP, Congress was surely aware of the ADA’s 
express pre-emption provision.  It was presumably aware, as well, that 
the Supreme Court had determined that the provision had a broad 
application and should be given an expansive interpretation.  Given 
this, we would expect Congress to have directed language in the WPP 
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Congress was not mandated to include an express preemption provision 
unless its intent was that the WPP did not preempt state whistleblower 
claims.114  The court held that while Botz’s claim fell within the scope of 
the “plain language” of the preemption provision—the WPP made it 
“unmistakable that such claims are pre-empted and dispel[led] whatever 
doubt might possibly linger after a plain-language analysis of the ADA’s 
pre-emption provision.”115 
2. The Majority Position:  The WPP Does Not Alter or Expand the 
ADA’s Preemption Provision 
Other circuits have refused to follow the Eighth Circuit’s 
approach.116  In 2003, the Eleventh Circuit, in Branche v. Airtran Airways, 
Inc., addressed the issue, declined to follow the Botz analysis, and 
provided the opposing view for circuits to apply in the future.117 
                                                                                                             
to the issue of federal pre-emption only if it had been Congress’s intent 
that the WPP not exert any pre-emptive effect upon state 
whistleblower provisions. 
Id. 
114 Id.  But see Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that the silence as to preemption is “susceptible to more than one 
interpretation”).  In regards to the ADA’s preemption provision, the Supreme Court has 
only interpreted “related to."  Id.  “[A]ir carrier services” has yet to be interpreted by the 
Supreme Court.  Id.  Congress was aware of the judicial interpretations among the circuits 
regarding “services,” and that most of the state retaliatory discharge claims were found not 
to be preempted by the ADA.  Id.  Thus, “it becomes significantly less clear that in saying 
nothing about pre-emption in the WPP Congress was somehow indicating that it assumed 
state whistleblower claims to be pre-empted.”  Id. 
115 Botz, 286 F.3d at 498. 
116 See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 2010) (following the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach); Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that the 
Eleventh Circuit provided the better approach); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264 (holding that the 
scope of the ADA is not expanded or altered by the WPP). 
117 See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1261–64 (concluding that the ADA’s WPP does not expand the 
scope of the ADA’s preemption provision).  In Branche, an Airtran DC-9 airplane landed at 
Tampa International Airport with one of its two engines running at a temperature 
exceeding FAA guidelines; a dangerous situation that can result in engine failure.  Id. at 
1251.  Airtran maintenance workers performed a test on the engine that they were 
unqualified and unauthorized to do, violating the FARs.  Id. at 1251–52.  Branche, an 
Airtran aircraft inspector, reported the violations to the FAA and was subsequently 
terminated.  Id. at 1252.  Branche says that: 
[A]fter the plane departed from [Tampa International Airport] on June 
30, 2001, the engine overheated during its flight to Atlanta and the 
plane subsequently was taken out of service. . . . [H]e alleges that the 
following day he investigated this particular engine and learned that it 
had overheated on two separate occasions during the preceding two 
weeks. 
Id.; see also Ventress, 603 F.3d at 693 (following the view set forth by the Eleventh Circuit); 
Gary, 397 F.3d at 190 (applying the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis); AirTran Whistleblower Gets 
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In Branche, the court divided its analysis into two steps.118  First, it 
questioned whether Branche’s state claim related to “prices, routes or 
services” of an air carrier resulting in preemption by the ADA.119  
Second, the court asked if the WPP expanded the scope of the ADA’s 
preemption provision, thus preempting Branche’s state whistleblower 
claim.120 
In addressing the first issue, the Eleventh Circuit held that Branche’s 
state whistleblower claim was unrelated to the “services” of an air carrier 
and therefore not preempted.121  The court reasoned that his state 
whistleblower claim was fundamentally an employment discrimination 
claim that did not affect any area of airline competition.122 
As for the second issue, the court carefully analyzed the reasoning 
set forth in Botz and held that the WPP does not require preemption of 
Branche’s state whistleblower claim.123  The court reasoned that the 
WPP’s silence as to preemption is ambiguous and could be read one of 
two ways.124  One can follow the reasoning set forth in Botz, and argue 
that Congress knew the preemption provision in the ADA was viewed 
broadly and intended the WPP to expand its preemptive scope to 
                                                                                                             
Day in Florida Court, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, Sept. 22, 2003 (stating that Branche wanted to 
bring a state claim “under Florida law so that a jury could hear his case”). 
118 See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1253–54, 1261 (applying the test set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Morales, and then determining whether the WPP expands the scope of the ADA’s 
preemption clause). 
119 Id. at 1253–61.  A state law is preempted by the ADA when it explicitly refers to airline 
rates, routes, or services, or has a significant economic effect upon them.  Id. at 1259; see 
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (establishing the test to apply 
when determining whether state law is preempted by the ADA).   
120 Branche, 342 F.3d at 1261.  The Branche court stated that preemption under the ADA is 
mandatory when the state law has a connection with airline prices, routes, or services.  Id. 
at 1254.  The court concluded that Branche’s state whistleblower claim did not expressly 
refer to airline services; therefore, the only way it can be preempted is if it has a significant 
economic effect on such services.  Id. at 1255.  The court did not share the broad view of the 
term “services.”  Id. at 1258.  Furthermore, the Branche court explained that “to pre-empt 
state law claims concerning other elements of airline operations that are not bargained for 
plainly would not further the goal of promoting competition in the airline industry.”  Id. at 
1256.  The Branche court concluded that “the phrase ‘related to the . . . services of an air 
carrier’ means having a connection with or reference to the elements of air travel that are 
bargained for.”  Id. at 1258 (alteration in original). 
121 Id. at 1261. 
122 Id.; cf. Marksteiner, supra note 77, at 40 (addressing the argument made by the airline 
industry that reporting safety violations relates to competition).  “[T]he aviation industry 
pleads its case by arguing that unnecessary or redundant safety measures will hurt 
profitability and therefore not promote domestic air commerce.  In its rule-making function, 
the FAA ends up balancing the competing interests of safety and airline profitability.”  Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
123 Branche, 342 F.3d at 1261–64. 
124 Id. at 1263.  The WPP does not state anything about preemption.  Id. 
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preempt state whistleblower claims.125  Conversely, one can argue that 
Congress’ knowledge of the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision 
“implies nothing about the legislature’s view of its scope.”126  Congress 
must have been aware that before enactment of the WPP, the majority of 
courts found state whistleblower claims were not preempted by the 
ADA.127  Therefore, by omitting a preemption clause in the WPP, it 
appeared that Congress viewed state whistleblower claims as not 
preempted.128 
Furthermore, inferring that Congress intended to preempt all 
equivalent state law claims with the enactment of the WPP would be 
implying preemption, and implied preemption is inapplicable when the 
statute includes an express preemption provision.129  The Eleventh 
Circuit held that the mere enactment of the WPP cannot justify 
expanding the scope of the express preemption provision to include and 
preempt all equivalent state whistleblower claims.130  The court further 
held that the Morales test should be applied when determining whether 
state whistleblower laws are preempted by the ADA, as amended by the 
WPP.131  Consequently, the only issue to determine is whether the state 
whistleblower claim is related to airline “‘rates, routes, or services.’”132 
Subsequently, the Third and Ninth Circuits declined to follow the 
Botz analysis and applied the Branche view.133  As a result, courts are 
split—some follow the Botz analysis while others tend to follow the 
                                                 
125 Id. 
126 Id.  “Simply stated, it is possible to point to a multitude of substantive contexts in 
which parallel state and federal remedies exist.”  Id. at 1264; see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 496–97 (1996) (explaining that state remedies can exist beside federal remedies). 
127 Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263. 
128 Id. at 1263–64; see Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 111–12 (1992) 
(explaining that the Court “will not infer pre-emption of the states’ historic police powers 
absent a clear statement of intent by Congress”). 
129 Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64; see Gade, 505 U.S. at 112 (stating “in express pre-emption 
cases, that Congress’ intent must be divined from the language, structure, and purposes of 
the statute as a whole”). 
130 Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64; see Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. 
Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass., 507 U.S. 218, 224 (1993) (explaining that state 
law should not be preempted unless it frustrates the federal scheme); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 
496–97 (discussing how federal and state remedies can coexist); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (discussing the principle that preemption should be judged 
on whether or not the state standard frustrates the objectives of the federal law). 
131 Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264; see supra Part II.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the ADA’s preemption clause and establishing the test to apply to 
determine preemption under the ADA). 
132 Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264. 
133 See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the WPP 
does not preempt state whistleblower claims); Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 189–90 
(3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the WPP does not expand the ADA’s preemption provision). 
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Branche analysis.134  The inconsistency in the application of the ADA’s 
preemption provision regarding the WPP has resulted in inequality in 
the relief sought by airline whistleblower employees.135  Some airline 
employees have their state whistleblower claims heard, while others are 
preempted.136  In addition, the federal remedy requires a delayed 
investigation process with the DOL that results in a minority of 
successful outcomes for employees.137  This can have an adverse effect on 
the overall safety of the airline industry by suppressing future 
whistleblower claims by airline employees.138  If employees are 
                                                 
134 See Torikawa v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 08-00322, 2009 WL 2151821, at *4 (D. Haw. 
July 17, 2009) (holding that the employee’s state whistleblower claim is not preempted by 
the ADA or the WPP); Meyer v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 08 C 0599, 2009 WL 367762, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Feb 15, 2009) (holding that the WPP does not preempt “all state law retaliatory 
discharge claims that relate to air safety”); Gervasio v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. 07-5530, 
2008 WL 2938047, at *3 (D.N.J. July 29, 2008) (holding that the WPP does not preempt state 
law whistleblower claims).  The question remains the same:  Is the state law related to rates, 
routes, or services?  Id.; James v. Evergreen Int’l Airlines, Inc., No. 07-CV-1640-HU, 2008 
WL 2564804, at *5 (D. Or. June 23, 2008) (concluding that the wrongful discharge claim is 
not preempted by the ADA, as amended by the WPP); Wright v. Nordam Grp., Inc., No. 
07-CV-0699-CVE-PJC, 2008 WL 802986, at *3 (N.D. Okla. March 20, 2008) (holding that the 
ADA, as amended by the WPP, preempts state whistleblower claims); Fadaie v. Alaska 
Airlines, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (“The Court's conclusion that 
plaintiffs’ retaliatory discharge claim is not ‘related to’ price, routes, or service is unaffected 
by the existence of the WPP.”); Tucker v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.., 268 F. Supp. 2d 
1360, 1363–64 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (stating that state whistleblower claims are preempted if they 
fall under the ADA’s preemption clause); Simonds v. Pan Am. Airlines, Inc., No. Civ. 03-
11-M, 2003 WL 22251155, at *4–5 (D.N.H. Sept. 30, 2003) (stating that preemption of state 
whistleblower claims should be determined on a case by case basis, and in this case the 
claim was preempted by the ADA, as amended by the WPP). 
135 See Ventress, 603 F.3d at 676, 683 (holding that the ADA’s preemption provision is 
unaltered after the enactment of the WPP); Gary, 397 F.3d at 189–90 (holding that the WPP 
does not expand the WPP’s preemption provision, therefore it does not preempt state 
whistleblower claims); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64 (holding that the WPP’s preemption 
clause is not altered or expanded by the WPP); Botz v. Omni Air Intern., 286 F.3d 488, 498 
(8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the WPP expands the scope of the WPP’s preemption 
provision). 
136 See supra notes 134–35 (discussing the different holdings reached by circuit courts and 
district courts concerning preemption of state whistleblower claims under the ADA, as 
amended by the WPP). 
137 See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (discussing the lengthy administrative 
process with the DOL and the small percentage of cases that result in favor of the 
employee). 
138 See Aviation Safety Protection Act of 1996:  Hearings on H.R. 3187 Before the Subcomm. on 
Aviation of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Comm., 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter 
1996 Hearings] (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (noting that the threat of whistleblower 
retaliation operates as an “unwritten company gag order”); OFFICE OF SYSTEM SAFETY, 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, A REPORT ON ISSUES RELATED TO PUBLIC INTEREST IN 
AVIATION SAFETY DATA 16 (1997) (discussing the need for a strong fiduciary relationship 
between the FAA and airline employees to ensure a high level of safety is maintained in the 
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permitted to institute state actions against their employers for violating 
state whistleblower statutes, they will not be as reluctant in reporting 
safety violations and airline safety will not deteriorate.139 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The circuit split concerning whether the WPP preempts state 
whistleblower claims must be resolved.140  An airline employee should 
have the option of bringing federal or state whistleblower claims against 
his employer.141  Allowing airline employees to bring either claim 
increases the amount of whistleblower protection, which will encourage 
violation reporting in the future and ensure the highest level of aviation 
safety.142  This Part will examine why the view adopted by the Eighth 
Circuit is incorrect and hazardous to airline safety, and why the 
opposing view—adopted by the Eleventh Circuit—is the correct 
approach.143 
First, Part III.A will discuss how the Eighth Circuit misinterpreted 
the WPP by finding that it expands the scope of the ADA’s preemption 
                                                                                                             
industry).  A “high degree[ ] of trust between the FAA and its safety partners” is necessary 
for the agency to carry out its safety mission as “its resources [are] increasingly constrained 
as the industry becomes more complex.”  Id. at 16; see also Marksteiner, supra note 77, at 50 
(discussing the need for aviation employees to report safety violations to ensure the FAA’s 
system is effective).  “[I]f aviation workers cannot report safety violations without fear of 
reprisal, they will not report these violations at all.  Under these conditions, the self-
reporting and self-correcting model will not work.”  Id.; Mike M. Ahlers, Southwest settles 
with FAA for $7.5 million, CNN (Mar. 2, 2009, 7:15 P.M.), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/ 
03/02/southwest.faa.settlement/index.html?iref=allsearch [hereinafter Ahlers, Southwest 
settles with FAA] (“Southwest operated 46 of its Boeing 737 jets on nearly 60,000 flights 
without performing mandatory inspections for fatigue cracks in their fuselages.”); FAA 
proposes a $1.45 million fine against Northwest Airlines, CNN (Mar. 23, 2010, 1:11 P.M.), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/03/23/northwest.airlines.fine/index.html?iref=all 
search (stating that “32 of the carrier’s 757s flew more than 90,000 passenger flights” while 
in an unsafe condition”). 
139 See 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (explaining that 
airline accidents could be prevented if safety violations are reported); OSHA, AIR21 and 
Whistleblower Protection, supra note 77, at 914 (explaining the benefits of increasing 
whistleblower protection); see also Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, 
The State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 100 (2000) (discussing how 
whistleblower statutes have been enacted in each of the fifty states). 
140 See supra notes 134–39 and accompanying text (explaining why the circuit split needs 
to be resolved). 
141 See infra Part III.A–C (explaining why federal and state remedies should be available 
to airline whistleblowers). 
142 See infra Part III.C (explaining that airline employees should have federal and state 
remedies available to them because it will provide more protection and increase violation 
reporting in aviation). 
143 See infra Part III.A–C (analyzing the different approaches taken by the circuits and 
explaining why the Eleventh Circuit’s approach is correct). 
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provision and expressly preempts state whistleblower claims.144  Next, 
Part III.B will analyze congressional intent, as illustrated in the 
legislative history of the statute, and how it further supports the Third, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’ position that Congress did not intend the 
WPP to expressly preempt similar state remedies.145  Finally, Part III.C 
will examine the detrimental effect the Eighth Circuit’s approach will 
have on airline safety by suppressing violation reporting in the aviation 
industry.146 
A. The Eighth Circuit Misinterpreted the ADA as Amended by the WPP 
This section will examine the flaws behind the Eighth Circuit’s 
holding that the WPP preempted state law whistleblower claims.147  The 
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is flawed in three respects.148  First, the Eighth 
Circuit casually inferred preemption even though it fell within 
traditional police powers of the state and there was no express 
preemption provision in the WPP.149  Second, the Eighth Circuit 
misinterpreted the goal of the ADA and the underlying objective behind 
enacting the WPP.150  Third, the Eighth Circuit relied on the fairness and 
uniformity of the WPP when, in reality, the WPP’s silence as to 
preemption has resulted in unfair inconsistency among the circuits.151 
First, the Eighth Circuit casually presumed preemption, even though 
the statute fell within the traditional police powers of the state.152  Police 
                                                 
144 See infra Part III.A (discussing how the Eighth Circuit “lightly inferred” preemption, 
misinterpreted the objectives of the ADA and the WPP, and erroneously relied on fairness 
and uniformity). 
145 See infra Part III.B (examining the WPP’s legislative history and how it supports the 
Eleventh Circuit’s approach that the WPP does not preempt state whistleblower remedies). 
146 See infra Part III.C (discussing how the Eighth Circuit’s approach will suppress future 
violation reporting in the aviation industry, and the detrimental effect this will have on 
airline safety). 
147 See infra notes 148–96 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws behind the 
reasoning used by the Eighth Circuit in support of its holding). 
148 See infra notes 148–96 and accompanying text (analyzing the three problems with the 
Eighth Circuit’s approach). 
149 See infra notes 152–69 and accompanying text (discussing how the Eighth Circuit 
casually presumed preemption when the statute involved a traditional police power of the 
state). 
150 See infra notes 170–82 and accompanying text (discussing how the Eighth Circuit 
misinterpreted the objectives of the ADA and the WPP). 
151 See infra notes 184–96 and accompanying text (explaining why the Eighth Circuit’s 
reliance on fairness and uniformity of the WPP is contradicted). 
152 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 234 (“[P]olice power allows state and local 
governments to adopt any law that is not prohibited by the Constitution.”); see also 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (stating that states have historically 
exercised their police powers to protect the safety of their citizens). 
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powers of the states are not to be preempted unless there is a “clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.”153  The Eighth Circuit reasoned that state 
whistleblower claims attempt to regulate the same area of the airline 
industry as the WPP, which provides protection for airline employees, 
and found that this was strong evidence of Congress’s “clear and 
manifest intent” to preempt state whistleblower claims related to air 
safety.154  However, merely enacting a federal remedy for airline 
whistleblowers is not evidence of Congress’s “clear and manifest 
purpose” to preempt all equivalent state remedies.155 
In support of this view, there is no express preemption provision in 
the WPP.156  The express preemption provision of the ADA is in a 
separate area of the statute, and it provides that state laws related to air 
carrier “price[s], route[s], or service[s]” are preempted.157  The Eighth 
Circuit reasoned that Congress was aware of the ADA’s express 
preemption provision and its broad interpretation, and that it would 
have included non-preemption language in the WPP if it intended such a 
result.158  However, Congress just as easily could have put an express 
preemption provision in the statute if that was its intent.159  The WPP is 
                                                 
153 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (explaining that the 
historic police powers of the states should not be preempted unless there is a “clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress”); Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(stating that there is a “well-established principle that ‘courts should not lightly infer 
preemption’”).  The Third Circuit explained that this principle “is particularly apt in the 
employment law context which falls ‘squarely within the traditional police powers of the 
states, and as such should not be disturbed lightly.’”  Id. 
154 See Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 496 (8th Cir. 2002) (arguing that the 
comprehensive scheme provided by the WPP is “powerful evidence of Congress’s clear 
and manifest intent to pre-empt state-law whistleblower claims related to air safety”). 
155 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496–97 (holding that a federal statutory remedy did not 
preempt equivalent state law remedies); Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 
1264 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he very enactment of a federal remedy, without more, cannot 
cause us to expand the scope of an express pre-emption provision to encompass and pre-
empt all equivalent state remedies.”). 
156 Whistleblower Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2006); see Maher, supra note 101, 
at 118 (“[S]uch silence should not serve as a basis for expanding the scope of § 41713 to 
cover all state law whistleblower claims.”). 
157 Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2006).  “[A] State . . .  may not enact 
or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to 
a price, route, or service of an air carrier . . . .”  Id. 
158 See  Botz, 286 F.3d at 496–97 (“[W]e would expect Congress to have directed language 
in the WPP to the issue of federal pre-emption only if it had been Congress’s intent that the 
WPP not exert any pre-emptive effect upon state whistleblower provisions.”). 
159 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (explaining that Congress would have 
enacted an express preemption provision if it believed state laws would interfere with the 
statute’s objectives).  Levine is a recent Supreme Court case addressing preemption of state 
laws in an area heavily regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).  Id.  The 
Court held that it was not impossible for drug manufacturers to comply with state and 
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silent in regards to preemption.160  Furthermore, whistleblower claims 
involve employment discrimination, which is a traditional police power 
of the states.161  The silence, in addition to involving a traditional police 
power, supports the position that state whistleblower claims are not 
preempted.162 
The Eighth Circuit’s inference that enacting a federal remedy means 
Congress intended all equivalent state laws to be preempted also falters 
because, as the Eleventh Circuit acknowledges, this would be implied 
preemption.163  Furthermore, the federal remedy cannot expand the 
scope of the express preemption provision to include all equivalent state 
remedies because complete preemption is inapplicable without clear 
congressional intent.164  Under the complete preemption doctrine, a 
statute preempts all equivalent state laws only when it satisfies two 
requirements:  it has an exclusive federal cause of action for the plaintiff 
and it unambiguously preempts state law.165  The argument that the 
                                                                                                             
federal law obligations, and state law claims do not interfere with Congress’s objectives in 
the FDCA.  Id.  The Court reasoned that Congress would have included an express 
preemption clause if that was its intent.  Id.  Congress’s silence regarding preemption and 
the fact that Congress was aware of the “prevalence of state tort litigation” is strong 
evidence that Congress did not intend federal oversight to be the “exclusive means of 
ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.”  Id.; see also Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263 (explaining 
that the absence of a preemption provision is susceptible to more than one interpretation). 
160 See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263 (stating that the WPP is silent about preemption).  
“Because the WPP says nothing about pre-emption and this silences is ambiguous, we find 
its enactment less probative of Congressional intent regarding the pre-emption of state 
whistleblower claims than did the Eighth Circuit.”  Id. 
161 See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (discussing how 
employment standards fall within the traditional police power of the states); Fort Halifax 
Packing Co.. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21 (1987) (explaining that preemption should not be 
“lightly inferred” when dealing with labor standards); Meyer v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 
08 C 0599, 2009 WL 367762, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2009) (discussing how the area of 
employment law falls within the traditional police powers of the states). 
162 See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263 (discussing how Congress’s silence on the preemption 
issue in the area of employment discrimination, which is typically controlled by the states, 
does not show an intent to preempt state whistleblower statutes). 
163 See id. at 1263–64 (stating that implied preemption is not applicable when the statute 
contains an express preemption provision); supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text 
(discussing implied preemption). 
164 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496–97 (1996) (holding that a federal 
statutory remedy did not preempt equivalent state law remedies); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264 
(“[I]t is possible to point to a multitude of substantive contexts in which parallel state and 
federal remedies exist . . . .”).  “[T]he very enactment of a federal remedy, without more, 
cannot cause us to expand the scope of an express pre-emption provision to encompass and 
pre-empt all equivalent state remedies.”  Id.; see also Siegle, supra note 46, at 1121 
(explaining that complete preemption occurs “where a statute has a ‘preemptive 
force . . . so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action’” (alteration in 
original)). 
165 Siegle, supra note 46, at 1107. 
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WPP is an exclusive federal cause of action is the following:  The WPP 
has an appeal process through the circuit courts ensuring uniformity, 
and if the WPP did not completely preempt state whistleblower claims 
they would interfere with this uniformity.166  However, it is clear that 
federal remedies can coexist with state remedies.167  In addition, there is 
too much ambiguity surrounding the question of whether the WPP 
preempts state laws.168  Thus, the WPP fails both requirements and does 
not fall under the complete preemption doctrine.169 
Second, the Eighth Circuit misinterpreted the statute’s objectives 
when it reasoned that Congress furthered the goals of the ADA by 
enacting the WPP.170  The Eighth Circuit held that the creation of a single 
uniform standard for dealing with employees’ whistleblowing will 
ensure price, availability, and efficiency of airlines by relying on market 
forces and competition, rather than allowing them to be determined by 
inconsistent state regulation.171  This is clearly the purpose of the ADA 
when it comes to state claims that “relate to” prices, routes, or services as 
                                                 
166 See Whistleblower Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2006) (explaining the appeal 
process if one is unsatisfied with the Secretary’s findings); Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 
488, 497 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining the uniformity that results from the WPP’s appeal 
process).  “By making the [Secretary’s] findings and remedy order in response to an 
employee’s complaint reviewable by the federal courts of appeals, Congress insured a more 
uniform interpretation of the WPP, and thus a more predictable response to public air-
safety complaints . . . .”  Id. 
167 See Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S at 496–97 (explaining the possibility for similar federal and 
state remedies to exist side by side). 
168 See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64 (holding that the WPP does not preempt state 
whistleblower claims); Botz, 286 F.3d at 498 (holding that the WPP preempts state 
whistleblower claims). 
169 See 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (providing a federal cause of action for airline employee 
whistleblowers with no explicit statement that it is the exclusive remedy for such 
whistleblowers); 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (2006) (illustrating the current saving clause, which 
states that “[a] remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by 
law”). 
170 See Botz, 286 F.3d at 497 (arguing that Congress “furthered its goal of ensuring that the 
price, availability, and efficiency of air transportation rely primarily upon market forces 
and competition” by enacting the WPP); FISCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (stating that 
“[s]afety has never been deregulated”). 
171 Botz, 286 F.3d at 497. 
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explained in the ADA’s express preemption provision.172  However, this 
argument lacks merit when applied to the WPP.173 
The purpose of the ADA was to deregulate the airline industry and 
promote “maximum reliance on competitive market forces.”174  Congress 
enacted the preemption provision to prevent states from interfering with 
this deregulation.175  Thus, the ADA and its preemption provision 
essentially deal with the economic perspective of the airline industry.176  
Whistleblower claims have to do with employment discrimination and 
the safety of the airlines, not the economic, efficiency, or competitive 
aspects of the airlines.177  Therefore, safety has a tenuous, at best, 
connection to “price, routes or services” of airlines.178 
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit, a uniform remedy for airline 
employees who report violations will not ensure price, availability or 
efficiency of airlines by relying on market forces and competition.179  
This is because airlines do not compete for safety.180  All airlines must 
                                                 
172 Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2006); see Morales v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378–79 (1992) (stating that “the ADA included a pre-emption 
provision, prohibiting the States from enforcing any law ‘relating to rates, routes, or 
services’ of any carrier”).  Congress determined that “maximum reliance on competitive 
market forces” would best benefit the airline industry by advancing efficiency, innovation, 
low prices, and the quality of services.  124 CONG. REC. 30662 (1978). 
173 See 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (explaining that the objective of the WPP was to 
provide whistleblower protection to airline employees to encourage violation reporting 
and ensure safety). 
174 124 CONG. REC. 30662 (1978); see AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 29 
(explaining that the ADA’s main purpose was “to remove government control over fares, 
routes and market entry (of new airlines) from commercial aviation”).  The ADA also 
“maint[ains] . . . safety as the highest priority in air commerce.”  Id. at 31. 
175 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). 
176 See supra notes 27–35 and accompanying text (explaining that heavy regulation prior 
to the ADA was inefficient, imposed high costs on customers, and needed to be 
deregulated to ensure reliance on competitive market forces). 
177 See infra notes 179–82 and accompanying text (explaining that airlines do not compete 
for safety because federal aviation regulations are mandatory for airlines); see also Branche 
v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the employment 
discrimination claim is not an area in which airlines compete). 
178 See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1261 (holding that the state whistleblower claim is not 
preempted under § 41713 because it “does not relate to the services of an air carrier within 
the meaning of [the statute]”); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 390 
(1992) (explaining that certain state laws may not be preempted by the ADA if they affect 
the scope of the statute “in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
179 See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264 (discussing how preempting state whistleblower claims 
relating to safety will “not advance the pro-competitive goals of the ADA”). 
180 See id. at 1260 (explaining why airlines do not compete for passengers on the basis of 
safety).  Passengers do not bargain for safety because “it is implicit in every ticket sold by 
every carrier.  Accordingly, it does not serve the purposes of the ADA to pre-empt state 
law employment claims related to safety.”  Id.; see also Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 
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comply with the same federal aviation regulations and laws; thus, all 
airlines are required to be safe.181  Safety is not going to further the 
purpose of the ADA and its preemption provision because it is not going 
to increase “reliance on competitive market forces.”182 
Finally, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the WPP fosters fairness for 
employees better than fifty inconsistent state whistleblower statutes 
because it provides uniform protection.183  However, the circuit split 
regarding whether or not these claims are preempted by the WPP 
contradicts the Eighth Circuit’s fairness argument.184  The text of the 
WPP is ambiguous regarding preemption; thus, airline employees 
continue to bring state claims.185  While the Eighth Circuit holds that 
equivalent state remedies are preempted, the majority of the circuits hold 
that they are not preempted.186  This has created inconsistency among 
                                                                                                             
F.3d 363, 373 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing how safety is a necessity for airlines).  “Safe 
operations . . . are a necessity for all airlines.”  Id.  Airlines do not have the option to choose 
which safety standards to conform to and which ones to disregard.  Id.  Safety is not an 
option when choosing modes of competition.  Id.  “For this reason, safety of an airline’s 
operations would not appear to fall within the ambit of the ADA and its procompetition 
preemption clause.”  Id. 
181 See CNN Wire Staff, Feds push $700,000 fine against Puerto Rican airline, CNN (June 28, 
2010, 2:53 P.M.), http://cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/06/28/faa.airline.fine/index.html?iref= 
allsearch (“‘All maintenance procedures must be followed at all times.  There are no 
exceptions when it comes to safety,’ FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt said.”). 
182 124 CONG. REC. 30662 (1978); see FISCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (stating that “[s]afety 
has never been deregulated”). 
183 Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2002).  “The WPP’s single, uniform 
scheme for responding to air-carrier employees’ reports of air-safety violations fosters 
fairness far better than a patchwork, hit-or-miss system of whistleblower protections 
scattered throughout the States.”  Id.  The court stated: 
By making the [Secretary’s] findings and remedy order in response to 
an employee’s complaint reviewable by the federal courts of appeals, 
Congress insured a more uniform interpretation of the WPP, and thus 
a more predictable response to public air-safety complaints, than 
would likely be possible if it had granted review in the courts of the 
fifty States. 
Id. 
184 See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64 (holding that the WPP does not preempt equivalent 
state remedies); Botz, 286 F.3d at 498 (holding that equivalent state whistleblower remedies 
are preempted by the WPP). 
185 Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that “the plain language 
of the WPP is wholly silent on the issue of preemption”).  The Third Circuit agrees with the 
Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that “Congress’ silence renders its intent ‘ambiguous’ at best 
and thus should not serve as a basis for expanding ADA preemption.”  Id. 
186 See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
ADA’s preemption provision is unaltered after the enactment of the WPP); Gary, 397 F.3d 
at 190 (holding that the WPP does not expand the ADA’s preemption provision, therefore it 
does not preempt state whistleblower claims); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264 (holding that the 
ADA’s preemption clause is not altered or expanded by the WPP); Botz, 286 F.3d at 498 
(holding that the WPP expands the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision). 
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the courts, resulting in unfairness among the airline employees.187  It is 
unfair that some employees may bring state claims, while others may 
not, especially because of the deficiencies with the WPP.188 
Although the WPP provides a uniform federal remedy, its 
imperfections have led many airline employees to pursue state claims.189  
The WPP requires complainants to go through a delayed investigation 
process with the DOL, in which complainants are unsuccessful about 
eighty percent of the time.190  Employees are also required to 
administratively appeal before they can bring their claim in federal 
court, and administrative appeals are unsuccessful about two-thirds of 
the time.191  “The [DOL] process [is] described as cumbersome rather 
than expeditious, biased rather than expert, ineffective rather than 
efficient, and as limiting access to the court rather than substituting 
superior procedures.”192  Thus, airline employees who want to 
“advocate[ ] judicial redress” bring state claims because state 
whistleblower statutes tend to rely more on judicial redress than 
administrative procedures.193  Employees who bring their claims under 
the WPP are not guaranteed their day in court or relief; however, 
employees who bring state claims are likely to receive their day in court 
in addition to a jury and punitive damages.194  Thus, many employees 
                                                 
187 See Gary, 397 F.3d at 190 (explaining why Gary’s state whistleblower claim was not 
preempted and could be brought in state court); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1262 (allowing the 
state whistleblower claim brought by Branche to be heard in state court); Botz, 286 F.3d at 
498 (preempting the state whistleblower claim brought by Botz). 
188 See AirTran Whistleblower, supra note 117 (explaining the lengthy DOL process and the 
few employees that succeed).  For example: 
The complaint is a common one, said Tom Divine, legal director for the 
Government Accountability Project, a Washington-based non-partisan 
pro-whistleblower advocacy group.  The process is “slower than 
molasses.  It is a black hole.”  In the 25 to 40 cases the [DOL] decides 
each year involving complaints against corporations, similar to 
Branche’s, Divine said about one-third of the cases are won by the 
employee. 
Id. 
189 See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (discussing the WPP’s deficiencies). 
190 See AirTran Whistleblower, supra note 117 (stating that employees may encounter a 
hostile environment when they bring state whistleblower claims as well); cf. notes 89–94 
and accompanying text (explaining the deficiencies in the DOL’s process, and stating that 
only nineteen percent of the claims are found to have merit). 
191 See supra text accompanying notes 93–94 (describing the unsuccessful outcome of 
appeals within the DOL regarding whistleblower claims). 
192 Vaughn, supra note 102, at 621. 
193 Id. 
194 See AirTran Whistleblower, supra note 117 (stating that Branche “wanted the issue tried 
under Florida law so that a jury could hear his case”).  Some states will even allow 
employees to seek punitive damages.  Id. 
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prefer state whistleblower remedies to the federal remedy.195  As a result, 
state whistleblower claims will proceed, a percentage of them will be 
preempted, and the unfairness among airline whistleblowers, regarding 
available remedies, will continue.196 
B. Legislative History and the Text of the WPP Support the View that the 
WPP Does Not Preempt State Whistleblower Claims 
The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits took the correct position 
that state whistleblower claims are not preempted by the WPP.197  They 
applied the position that the alleged harm traditionally fell within state 
power and the express preemption clause in the ADA must be construed 
narrowly.198  Although silence as to preemption may be interpreted both 
ways, it is crucial that Congress does not mention preemption in the 
WPP.199 
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, Congress’s knowledge 
about the ADA’s preemption provision implies nothing about its intent 
regarding the WPP.200  In fact, as the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, Congress 
should have been aware that the majority of courts found state 
whistleblower claims not to be preempted by the ADA prior to enacting 
the WPP.201  Furthermore, when Congress is aware of “the operation of 
                                                 
195 See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (discussing the deficiencies in the federal 
remedy and why employees may prefer to bring state whistleblower claims). 
196 See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text (explaining how the circuit split has led 
to unfairness among airline employees). 
197 See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
WPP does not expand the ADA’s preemption provision and does not preempt state 
whistleblower claims); Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
WPP does not preempt state whistleblower claims); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64 (holding 
that state whistleblower claims are not preempted by the WPP). 
198 See Ventress, 603 F.3d at 682 (analyzing preemption under “the presumption that 
‘because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, . . . Congress does not 
cavalierly preempt state-law causes of action’” (alteration in original)).  “This is especially 
true in the area of employment law, which ‘falls within the traditional police power of the 
State.’”  Id.; see also Gary, 397 F.3d at 190 (explaining that preemption should not be inferred 
lightly when it falls within the traditional police powers of the states); Branche, 342 F.3d at 
1259 (“[E]mployment standards fall squarely within the traditional police powers of the 
states, and as such should not be disturbed lightly.”). 
199 See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263 (“[I]t becomes significantly less clear that in saying 
nothing about pre-emption in the WPP Congress was somehow indicating that it assumed 
state whistleblower claims to be pre-empted.”). 
200 See Maher, supra note 101, at 118 (“Congress’s knowledge of § 41713 and the Supreme 
Court’s broad interpretation thereof certainly does not imply that Congress intended to 
expand the scope of § 41713 to encompass all state law whistleblower claims.”). 
201 See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1259–60 (citing various cases that held the preemption clause 
of the ADA did not include whistleblower claims); Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 
590, 597–98 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the connection between a claim for retaliatory 
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state law in a field of federal interest” and has tolerated it, the argument 
for federal preemption is “particularly weak.”202 
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit’s position is supported by 
legislative history.203  The main objective of the WPP was to provide 
whistleblower protection to “airline employees so they can reveal 
legitimate safety problems without fear of retaliation.”204  Whistleblower 
protection for airline employees was one of the “important safety 
initiatives” in the legislation.205  The WPP was included in the legislation 
“to aid in our safety efforts and protect workers willing to expose safety 
problems.”206  Therefore, legislative history clearly supports the position 
that the goal of the WPP was to increase the level of safety in the airlines 
by encouraging violation reporting.207  However, the legislative history 
                                                                                                             
discharge and airline “services” was too remote to be preempted by the ADA); Espinosa v. 
Cont’l Airlines, 80 F. Supp. 2d 297, 301 (D.N.J. 2000) (rejecting the argument that the state 
whistleblower claim was related to the quality of services of an airline and preempted by 
the ADA); see also Maher, supra note 101, at 118–19 (explaining how the majority of cases 
prior to the enactment of the WPP did not find that the ADA preempted state 
whistleblower cause of actions). 
202 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989)) (discussing how there is no strong argument 
for preemption when Congress has allowed state law to exist in an area of federal interest). 
203 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-167, pt. 1, at 85 (1999) (“Private sector employees who make 
disclosures concerning health and safety matters pertaining to the workplace are protected 
against retaliatory action by various Federal laws.”).  “These employees have become 
known as ‘whistleblowers.’”  Id.  Before the WPP was enacted, “[t]here [were] no laws 
specifically designed to protect airline employee whistleblowers.”  Id.  Airline employees 
are private sector employees, and the WPP was “specifically designed” to protect them.  Id.; 
see also AirTran Whistleblower, supra note 117 (stating how private sector employees also 
have protection from the states). 
204 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000).  Congress intended the WPP to protect airline employees 
who report violations and encourage them to come forward.  Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 106-513, 
at 216 (2000) (explaining that Title VI of the bill “[e]stablishes procedures to protect 
whistleblowers”).  Title VI “[p]rohibits airlines and their contractors or subcontractors from 
taking adverse action against an employee whom provided or is about to provide (with 
any knowledge of the employer) any safety information.”  Id.  But see Thomas M. Devine & 
Donald G. Alpin, Whistleblower Protection—The Gap Between the Law and Reality, 31 HOW. L.J. 
223, 224 (1988) (arguing that statutes are not effective in protecting whistleblowers). 
205 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000). 
206 146 CONG. REC. 2178 (2000).  But see Whistleblower Bill Would Help FAA With 
Enforcement, Unions Say, AVIATION DAILY, Jul. 15, 1996 at 71 (stating that the Air 
Transportation Association believed formal complaints and enforcement proceedings 
under the WPP would impede rather than encourage violation reporting). 
207 146 CONG. REC. 2178 (2000) (“We also have provided whistleblower protection to aid 
in our safety efforts and protect workers willing to expose safety problems.”).   
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does not state that the WPP was intended to be an exclusive remedy for 
whistleblowers.208 
State law should not be preempted if it furthers the objectives of 
federal law, and state whistleblower claims clearly further the WPP’s 
objectives by providing protection for airline employees, encouraging 
violation reporting in airline industry, and thus increasing aviation 
safety.209  The purpose of the WPP was to encourage violation reporting 
and ensure safety in the airline industry by “provid[ing] protection for 
airline employee whistleblowers.”210  Affording both state and federal 
whistleblower protection would allow even more protection for airline 
whistleblowers, thus further encouraging airline employees to report 
safety violations in the airlines.211  If airline employees have two 
remedial choices at their fingertips, the fear of retaliation will be 
significantly suppressed.212  Congress intended to protect airline 
                                                 
208 See generally 146 CONG. REC. 2178 (2000) (explaining that whistleblower protection 
would aid in safety efforts); 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (explaining that Congress intended 
the WPP to protect airline whistleblowers and encourage them to come forward). 
209 See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & 
Contractors of Mass., 507 U.S. 218, 224 (1993) (discussing how state law should not be 
preempted unless it frustrates the federal scheme); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 
238, 256 (1984) (explaining that preemption should be judged on whether or not the state 
standard frustrates the objectives of the federal law); Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 139, 
at 100 (discussing the legal protection states provide for whistleblowers).  “Whistleblower 
protection statutes have been enacted in each of the fifty states.  All of these laws have the 
same objectives [sic]:  to expose, deter, and curtail wrongdoing.”  Id. 
210  H.R. REP. NO. 106-167, pt. 1, at 85 (1999).  Title VI of the reported bill would provide 
protection for airline employee whistleblowers by prohibiting the discharge or other 
discrimination against an employee who provides information to its employer or the 
federal government about air safety or files or participates in a proceeding relating to air 
safety.  Id.; see 146 CONG. REC. 2178 (2000) (explaining that whistleblower protection would 
“aid in our safety efforts”). 
211 See Taylor, supra note 6 (explaining how the courts and the administrative arena are 
the most effective forums for whistleblowers).  The author stated: 
[T]he courts and the administrative arena are the forums where the 
whistleblower can get the most effective personal protection from 
retaliation for whistleblowing and the most comprehensive relief for 
the injuries they suffer at the hands of their adversaries.  It also can 
provide an effective arena to hold culpable parties accountable for 
their actions in specific types of situations. 
Id. 
212 See OSHA, AIR21 and Whistleblower Protection, supra note 77, at 914 (explaining the 
benefits of increasing whistleblower protection).  The author explained: 
The theory behind increased whistleblower protection is that “the 
more money and other remedies available to the employee, the more 
hesitant the employer will be to take negative job action.”  Therefore, 
the stakes need to be high enough so that employers will not be 
tempted to wrongfully retaliate against whistleblowing. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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employees who report violations; thus, it seems more plausible that 
Congress would embrace a state law that provided additional 
whistleblower protection, further encouraging such reporting, rather 
than preempt it.213 
C. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach and its Detrimental Effect on Airline Safety 
The Eighth Circuit’s approach is detrimental to the future of aviation 
safety because it preempts all state whistleblower claims, thereby 
suppressing future violation reporting in the aviation industry.214  If 
airline employees fear they will not be protected from retaliation, they 
will choose not to report violations.215  The purpose behind enacting a 
federal remedy for aviation industry whistleblowers is to ensure that the 
airlines maintain a high standard of safety.216  The aviation industry is 
unique in respect to other industries because violation reporting protects 
the millions of people who fly each day by ensuring their airplanes are 
safe for flight.217 
Conversely, in support of the Eighth Circuit’s approach, violation 
reporting can impose frivolous claims and higher costs on the airlines.218  
Thus, “[p]rofit and loss cuts two ways in airline safety.”219  Airline 
                                                 
213 See 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (explaining that the intent of Congress was to protect 
airline employees who report violations). 
214 See Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 496–98 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that state 
whistleblower claims are preempted by the WPP); 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement 
of Patricia A. Friend) (discussing how employees are reluctant to come forward with 
violations even when they have whistleblower protection). 
215 See OSHA, AIR21 and Whistleblower Protection, supra note 77, at 914 (discussing the 
difficult choice employees must make when deciding whether to report a violation).  “No 
employee should be put in the position of having to choose between his or her job and 
reporting violations that threaten the safety of passengers and crew.”  Id. at 913–14. 
216 See 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (explaining that the purpose of the WPP was to 
encourage airline employees to come forward and to aid in Congressional safety efforts in 
regards to the airlines). 
217 See 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (explaining how 
large quantities of accidents could be prevented if airline employees discover and report 
safety concerns). 
218 See Jason M. Zuckerman, Minimizing the Risk of Whistleblower Retaliation Claims (Spring 
2004) (explaining how the airlines face several regulatory and economic challenges).  
Airlines cannot afford more whistleblower claims.  Id.  In addition to increased costs, 
whistleblower claims create increased negative publicity.  Id.; cf. id. (recommending that 
airline employees familiarize themselves with the whistleblower protection that is available 
to them in an effort to minimize their exposure to retaliation claims). 
219 Ronald John Lofaro & Kevin M. Smith, Rising Risk? Risking Safety? The Millennium and 
Air Travel, 25 TRANSP. L.J 205, 213 (1998) 
When any air carrier is in financial trouble . . . there are only a few 
ways open to cut costs:  Reduce the “quality” and training of both 
flightcrew and mechanics, reduce the “quality” of the maintenance and 
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employees are protected under the WPP and various state claims for 
alleged violations, not just actual violations.220  Thus, increased violation 
reporting may result in more reports of alleged violations, which 
heightens the risk of false reporting.221  Furthermore, if airline employees 
are allowed to bring state whistleblower claims, the airlines risk the 
possibility of more lawsuits and larger damages.222  Airline employees 
may also face increased costs from taking planes out of service to comply 
with maintenance regulations.223  Despite these arguments, safety 
remains the ultimate priority in the aviation industry, and 
“[w]histleblower protection is sound public safety policy.”224 
                                                                                                             
outsource all you can. . . . When carriers need to save money, they may 
try to operate at or below minimums.  Result?  The safety margin 
evaporates and is replaced by a rising risk. 
Id. 
220 See Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 495 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The [state] statute’s 
authorization to refuse assignments is not limited to actual violations.”).  The state 
whistleblower statute “extends to any assignment which the flight attendant has an 
objective, factual basis merely to believe is in violation.”  Id. 
221 See Whistleblower Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2006) (indicating that 
frivolous claims are subjected to fines). 
222 AirTran Whistleblower, supra note 117 (discussing how state whistleblower claims will 
result in higher costs for the airline).  Jeffrey Pasek, a whistleblower litigation specialist, 
stated:  “‘It opens up a lot more courthouses where these cases can be tried,’ . . . .  In 
addition, some states will permit employees to sue supervisors as well as seek punitive 
damages.”  Id. 
223 MARY SCHIAVO, FLYING BLIND, FLYING SAFE 48–49 (1997) (discussing the costs of 
safety).  Schiavo stated: 
At its core, safety isn’t cost-effective.  Recommendations for changes in 
airline practices, for new equipment, for improved safety rules were 
evaluated not in terms of how many accidents they might prevent or 
lives they might save, but in terms of how many dollars they would 
cost the airlines, aircraft builders, parts manufacturers or fleet 
maintenance companies. 
Id.  An important issue for the airlines to address when determining whether to perform 
maintenance, and thus comply with regulations, is “how much it would cost the airlines in 
lost revenue while planes were pulled out of service.”  Id. at 49. 
224 See 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (discussing how 
“Americans would be shocked to learn that flight attendants, pilots and mechanics today 
can be fired for reporting a safety violation.”).  Patricia A. Friend, International President of 
the Association of Flight Attendants, stated: 
To place workers in the position of risking their career when they 
report safety concerns to the FAA or Congress is poor aviation policy.  
Would American airline passengers want to fly on an airline with an 
unwritten company policy that gags its workers’ safety concerns?  I 
certainly doubt it.  Whistleblower protection is sound public safety 
policy. 
Id.; cf. Zuckerman, supra note 218 (stating that over 210 claims were filed, and many 
employees  succeeded in obtaining meaningful recoveries). 
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The Eighth Circuit disregarded the public policy behind 
whistleblower protection in the aviation industry.225  It is important to 
encourage violation reporting in the airline industry to ensure a high 
level of safety.226  In recent years, there have been many problems with 
the airlines and their compliance with regulations.227  Although the 
number of accidents per year has decreased dramatically in the last 
decade, the number of violations and the amount of fines imposed on 
airlines continues to increase.228  It is evident that the airlines are 
                                                 
225 See 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (statement of Rep. Shuster) (explaining that Congress 
intended the WPP to encourage airline employees to come forward and report violations); 
FISCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 10 (explaining the concern that the airline industry has fallen 
into complacency regarding safety); Taylor, supra note 6 (stating that the world would be 
more dangerous and deceitful if whistleblowers lacked the courage to come forward). 
226 See 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (explaining that 
airline accidents could be avoided if airline employees discovered safety violations and 
reported them to proper authorities who acted upon them in an adequate manner). 
227 See Ahlers, Southwest settles with FAA for $7.5 million, supra note 138 (“Southwest 
operated 46 of its Boeing 737 jets on nearly 60,000 flights without performing mandatory 
inspections for fatigue cracks in their fuselages.”); Mike M. Ahlers, FAA levies more fines 
against American Eagle regional airline, CNN (Feb. 17, 2010, 8:27 P.M.), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/02/17/american.eagle.fines/index.html?iref=allsea
rch [hereinafter Ahlers, FAA levies more fines] (stating that American Eagle airlines “flew 
four Bombardier regional jets on more than 1,100 flights between February and May 2008, 
with main landing-gear doors that had not been repaired as ordered by the FAA in August 
2006”); FAA proposes a $1.45 million fine against Northwest Airlines, supra note 138 (stating 
that “32 of the carrier’s 757s flew more than 90,000 passenger flights between December 1, 
2005 and May 27, 2008, while not in compliance with the airworthiness directive”); Michael 
Ahlers, US Airways, United face FAA fines for safety violations, CNN (Oct. 14, 2009), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-14/travel/us.arilines.fines_1_faa-united-airlines-
airways?_s=PM:TRAVEL [hereinafter Ahlers, US Airways, United face FAA fines] (stating 
that “US Airways operated the eight aircraft on a total of 1,647 flights last fall and winter 
while the planes were in a potentially unsafe condition”).  United Airlines involved one 
aircraft that flew over 200 times in an unsafe condition.  Id. 
228 See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 10.  Illustrating the statistics over the last decade: 
Between 2002 and 2006, there were nine fatal accidents involving 
commercial air carriers, four of which involved passenger fatalities.  
The accident rate over this period was roughly one fatal accident for 
every ten million hours flown (0.01 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight 
hours).  By comparison, a decade earlier, during the period from 1992 
through 1996, fatal airline accidents were occurring at a rate of about 
one every 3.7 million flight hours (0.027 fatal accidents per 100,000 
flight hours).  Thus, the fatal airline accident rate has been reduced by 
a factor of about 2.7 over the past decade. 
Id.; see Ahlers, FAA levies more fines, supra note 227 (“The [FAA] . . . proposed a $2.9 million 
fine against American Eagle Airlines for allegedly conducting more than 1,100 flights using 
planes with landing-gear doors that had not been repaired as prescribed by the FAA.”); 
Ahlers, Southwest settles with FAA, supra note 138 (“Southwest Airlines will pay $7.5 million 
to settle complaints that it flew unsafe aircraft, and the fine will double unless the airline 
completes additional safety measures within a year . . . .”); Ahlers, US Airways, United face 
FAA fines, supra note 227 (“The FAA is seeking a $5.4 million fine from US Airways and a 
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suffering from a complacent attitude, which can have a detrimental 
effect on air safety.229  Complacency in the aviation world has resulted in 
several accidents; thus, it is important that airlines avoid falling into a 
“false sense of security” due to their low accident rate.230  Airlines must 
comply with mandatory regulations to ensure their successful safety 
record continues; one mishap can result in hundreds of lives lost.231  
Furthermore, the violations incurred by airlines over the recent years are 
violations that should have been reported.232  It is essential that airline 
employees are provided sufficient whistleblower protection to encourage 
violation reporting and ensure our skies are safe.233  Aviation 
                                                                                                             
$3.8 million fine from United Airlines for unrelated violations.”); American Airlines fined 
$7.1 million for safety violations, CNN (Aug. 14, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-08-
14/travel/american.airlines.faa_1_faa-inspector-american-airlines-md-80?_s=PM:TRAVEL 
(“Federal regulators announced $7.1 million in fines against American Airlines . . . .”); 
CNN Wire Staff, Continental faces fine for FAA violations, CNN (July 27, 2010, 2:51 P.M.), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/07/27/continental.faa.fine/index.html?iref=allsear
ch (“Continental Airlines faces a fine of $230,000 for violations of Federal Aviation 
Administration regulations . . . .”); FAA proposes a $1.45 million fine against Northwest 
Airlines, supra note 138 (“Federal aviation regulators . . . propos[ed] a $1.45 million civil 
penalty against Northwest Airlines for operating nearly three dozen of its Boeing 757 
planes without proper windshield wiring inspections.”). 
229 FISCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 10.  Explaining that despite the decrease in fatal airline 
accidents: 
[S]ome aviation safety professionals and some Members of Congress 
have expressed concern that the industry and regulators may have 
been lulled into complacency with regard to safety.  This concern has 
been heightened recently in response to various findings that airlines 
have failed to fully comply with aircraft inspections and repairs 
mandated by the FAA. 
Id. 
230 See ALEXANDER T. WELLS & CLARENCE C. RODRIGUES, COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY 
149 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the dangers of complacency in commercial aviation).  
“Complacency or a false sense of security should not be allowed to develop as a result of 
long periods without an accident or serious incident.  An organization with a good safety 
record is not necessarily a safe organization.”  Id.; see also Lt. Col. Devon McCollough, 
Commentary, Why Worry About Complacency?, U.S. AIR FORCE (July 23, 2010), 
http://www.lajes.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123214637 (explaining the importance of 
staying “alert for hazards” and avoiding the complacency attitude in aviation).  
Complacency has been a major factor in several aviation accidents and incidents.  Id. 
231 See McCollough, supra note 230 (discussing the problems with complacency).  
“‘Complacency kills’” is a popular saying in the aviation world.  Id.  Even when the 
accident rate is low, it is important to stay “vigilant” and detect hazards before they result 
in accidents.  Id. 
232 See 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (explaining how 
some airlines continue to fly airplanes when safety is compromised). 
233 See 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (statement of Rep. Shuster) (explaining that the WPP 
was enacted to encourage airline employees to come forward and report violations); 
Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 139, at 100 (stating that the objectives behind state 
whistleblower statutes are the same). 
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whistleblowers should not be retaliated against; rather, the public should 
be grateful for their efforts to ensure passenger safety.234 
Airline employees, such as mechanics and pilots, are “trained and 
skilled safety professionals” who work in and around aircrafts daily.235  
They have firsthand experience of the problems that can threaten the 
safety of an air carrier in flight.236  Therefore, aviation employees “should 
be able to step forward and report their concerns” when an “airline 
decides to compromise safety in order to lower its costs.”237  However, 
“without strong whistleblower protections, employees are reluctant to 
come forward and many safety problems could go unreported.”238  Many 
of these employees stay silent in fear of being retaliated against.239  In 
order to encourage violation reporting, airline employees must know 
their career is not on the line.  These employees are more than entitled to 
sufficient protection; therefore, state whistleblower claims should not be 
preempted by the WPP.240 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Since the enactment of the WPP, the circuit courts have generated 
confusion as to whether the WPP expands the scope of the ADA’s 
                                                 
234 See OSHA, AIR21 and Whistleblower Protection, supra note 77, at 913 (explaining that 
aviation employees “perform an important public service when they choose to report 
safety concerns”); Taylor, supra note 6 (stating that the world would be a more dangerous 
place without whistleblowers’ acts of courage). 
235 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of John J. Duncan, Chairman). 
236 See id. (explaining that airline employees are the best people to report safety violations 
because they have experience with the certain problems and violations that can threaten 
the safety of an airplane in flight). 
237 See id. (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (explaining that the result of reporting a 
violation in the airlines will be “a safer, stronger airline and industry”).  Patricia A. Friend 
stated: 
Airlines argue that they monitor their own safety and encourage 
employees to bring forward their concerns.  For many airlines, this is 
true.  Yet, judging by the number of fines, groundings and 
investigations by the Federal Aviation Administration, we know that 
some airlines do cut corners and compromise safety.  Nonetheless, 
airlines committed to safety have nothing to fear in this legislation. 
Id. 
238 Id. (statement of John J. Duncan, Chairman S. Comm. on Aviation). 
239 See id. (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (explaining how she has “received reports of 
incidents from several other airlines where supervisors have threatened and harassed flight 
attendants in an effort to deter the reporting of safety violations”).  It is difficult to 
encourage employees to come forward with violations, even when they have 
whistleblower protection.  Id. 
240 See id. (explaining airline employees’ entitlement to whistleblower protection). 
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preemption clause.241  The courts’ inconsistent application of the WPP 
has resulted in state whistleblower claims being heard in some courts, 
while being completely preempted in others.242  Preempting state 
whistleblower claims will decrease the amount of whistleblower 
protection given to airline employees, which will suppress future 
violation reporting and have a detrimental effect on the overall safety of 
the airline industry.243  Therefore, the conflict must be resolved to ensure 
the highest level of safety in the airlines.244 
Accordingly, this Part proposes two solutions to ameliorate the 
circuit split concerning whether the WPP preempts equivalent state 
claims.245  First, this Part proposes an amendment to the WPP, which 
expressly indicates that state laws are not preempted.246  Alternatively, 
this Part proposes that the Supreme Court grant certiorari, uphold the 
majority position, and clarify “services.”247 
A. Proposed Amendment to the WPP 
This section proposes an amendment that will ensure state laws are 
not preempted under the WPP.248  In addition, the amendment will make 
it clear that a claim may not be brought under both the WPP and an 
equivalent provision of law.249  Consequently, the proposed amendment 
will guarantee that the statute is interpreted consistently among the 
circuits.250  The proposed amendment, and its recommended subsection, 
is as follows: 
                                                 
241 See supra Part II.E (discussing the circuit split concerning whether the WPP preempts 
state whistleblower claims). 
242  See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text (illustrating the different conclusions 
reached by the courts regarding the preemptive effect of the WPP); supra Part III.A 
(discussing the non-uniformity among the courts regarding the preemption of state 
whistleblower claims and the unfairness that has resulted among airline employees). 
243 See supra Part III.C (examining the detrimental effect the preemption of state 
whistleblower claims will have on airline safety). 
244 See infra notes 253–70 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of amending the 
WPP to include the proposed amendment). 
245 See infra Part IV.A–B (discussing two proposed solutions to resolve the circuit split). 
246 See infra Part IV.A (proposing an amendment to the WPP that will resolve the circuit 
split and benefit the airline industry). 
247 See infra Part IV.B (proposing a model test to apply when determining preemption 
under the WPP). 
248 See infra text accompanying notes 248–70 (proposing a no-preemption clause be added 
to the WPP indicating that state whistleblower claims are not preempted). 
249 See infra text accompanying note 252 (proposing an amendment that will prevent 
employees from bringing two equivalent causes of action for the same unlawful act). 
250 See infra text accompanying note 252 (explaining how the amended WPP will 
expressly indicate that state whistleblower claims are not preempted, resulting in a 
uniform interpretation of the WPP). 
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Proposed Amendment to 49 U.S.C. § 42121251 
(f) No Preemption:  The WPP shall not preempt or diminish any other 
safeguards provided by Federal or State law against discharge of an employee or 
discrimination against an employee in violation of subsection (a).  An employee 
shall not seek protection under both this section and another provision of Federal 
or State law for the same allegedly unlawful conduct of the employer.252 
Commentary 
The proposed amendment is the most beneficial solution regarding 
statutory remedies because:  it is a simple fix that indicates state claims 
are not preempted; it provides consistent application of the WPP among 
the circuits; and it provides airline employees with an option other than 
the WPP’s investigative process through the DOL.253  The amended WPP 
will increase the amount of whistleblower protection for airline 
employees, encourage airline employees to report violations, and 
promote the highest level of safety in the airlines.254 
First, the amended WPP will increase whistleblower protection by 
providing airline employees with the option of pursuing a federal or 
state claim.255  A no-preemption provision will explicitly indicate that the 
WPP is not the sole remedy for airline whistleblowers.256  The result will 
be a consistent interpretation of the WPP among the circuits.257  
Therefore, the amended WPP will provide airline employees with more 
                                                 
251 Whistleblower Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121(2006). 
252 This proposal is the contribution of the author.  The proposed amendment is italicized 
and was modeled after 6 U.S.C. § 1142(e)–(f) (2006).  For purposes of this amendment, 
retaliatory discharge shall be defined according to the common legal usage.  See BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 530 (defining retaliatory discharge as “[a] discharge that 
is made in retaliation for the employee’s conduct (such as reporting unlawful activity by 
the employer to the government) and that clearly violates public policy”).  See generally 6 
U.S.C. § 1142(e)–(f) (2006) (providing a no preemption clause and an election of remedies 
clause). 
253 See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text (discussing the process one must go 
through with the DOL when pursuing a claim under the WPP). 
254 See infra notes 253–70 and accompanying text (discussing the impact the amended 
WPP will have on the airline industry). 
255 See OSHA, AIR21 and Whistleblower Protection, supra note 77, at 914 (explaining the 
benefits of increasing whistleblower protection); supra notes 183–96 and accompanying text 
(discussing the inconsistency among the circuits in allowing state whistleblower claims and 
the unfairness that has resulted among airline employees). 
256 See supra text accompanying note 252 (illustrating the text of the no-preemption 
provision that should be amended to the WPP). 
257 See supra notes 134–35 (stating the different holdings reached by courts when 
confronted with the issue of whether the WPP preempts state whistleblower claims); infra 
text accompanying notes 253–70 (explaining the benefits of allowing state whistleblower 
claims to be brought by airline employees). 
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protection when their employers retaliate against them for reporting 
violations to the airline or the FAA.258 
Consequently, the amended WPP will encourage violation reporting 
to the FAA.259  The additional protection will entice airline employees to 
report safety violations to the FAA, even though states afford varying 
levels of protection to whistleblowers.260  If violation reporting is 
increased, the FAA’s safety program will be more successful, airlines will 
not get away with as many violations as they currently are, and airline 
safety will not be compromised.261  Furthermore, the WPPs objectives 
will remain unchanged with the addition of the proposed amendment 
because the amendment shares the WPP’s purpose of encouraging 
airline employees to come forward with violations by giving them 
proper protection when employers retaliate against them.262  In fact, the 
amended WPP will advance the purpose of the WPP by providing more 
protection to airline employees, thus encouraging more violation 
reporting and ultimately increasing the amount of violations that are 
reported.263 
Although the amended WPP may result in higher costs and more 
litigation for the airlines, it will promote the highest level of airline 
safety.264  The FAA created a program to protect information submitted 
to the FAA.265  The program was intended to encourage airline 
employees, such as pilots and mechanics, to report violations to the FAA, 
which would aid in the efforts of increasing safety in the aviation 
industry.266  However, when there is insufficient whistleblower 
                                                 
258 See supra Part III.C (discussing the benefits of increased whistleblower protection).  
But see Susan Sauter, The Employee Health and Safety Whistleblower Protection Act and the 
Conscientious Employee:  The Potential for Federal Statutory Enforcement of the Public Policy 
Exception to Employment At Will, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 513, 513 (1990) (arguing that state 
whistleblower claims cause inconsistent and erratic results in state courts). 
259 See supra Part III.B (discussing how the WPP was enacted to encourage violation 
reporting). 
260 See supra Parts III.A–C (explaining why state whistleblower laws should not be 
preempted by the WPP). 
261 See supra Part III.C (explaining the importance of violation reporting and its effect on 
safety). 
262 See supra Part III.B (discussing the legislative history of the WPP); supra notes 204–08 
(indicating that the WPP’s objective was to encourage violation reporting and ensure 
safety). 
263 See supra Part III.C (discussing how sufficient whistleblower protection will encourage 
violation reporting). 
264 See infra text accompanying notes 264–70 (indicating that the amended WPP will 
promote safety in the airline industry). 
265 See supra note 77 (explaining the safety program of the FAA). 
266 See supra notes 235–36 and accompanying text (explaining that airline employees, such 
as pilots and mechanics, are the best identifiers of violations due to their first hand 
experiences). 
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protection, people fail to report violations due to their fear of employer 
retaliation.267  Thus, by ensuring a sufficient amount of whistleblower 
protection and encouraging airline employees to report violations, the 
amended WPP will aid the FAA in its mission “to provide a safe, secure, 
and efficient global aviation system.”268  Airlines must conform to 
regulations to ensure every plane is airworthy before it flies to its 
destination carrying hundreds of passengers.269  Ultimately, the 
amended WPP benefits the public as a whole by ensuring violations are 
reported to the proper authorities and that no plane takes off when it 
fails to comply with regulations.270 
B. The Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorari, Adopt the Majority Position, 
and Clarify “Services” 
This section proposes an alternative solution to the circuit split—
adoption of the majority position and clarification of “services.”271  The 
ADA’s preemption provision has only been interpreted twice by the 
Supreme Court.272  After the Morales test was established, some circuits 
adopted a narrow definition of “service” and others adopted a broad 
definition.273  The WPP further complicated the Morales analysis when it 
was amended to the ADA without clearly addressing preemption of 
state whistleblower claims.274  Therefore, the Supreme Court should 
grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split regarding whether the ADA, as 
amended by the WPP, preempts state whistleblower claims.275 
The Court should adopt the view taken by the Third,  Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits, which held that the WPP does not preempt state 
                                                 
267 See supra notes 238–39 and accompanying text (noting airline employees’ fear of 
reporting violations due to possible retaliation by their employers, and how this can affect 
the number of violations that are reported and safety in flight). 
268 See supra note 5 (quoting the mission of the FAA); supra Part III.C (discussing the 
importance of reporting violations to the FAA to ensure the highest level of safety). 
269 See supra Part III.C (discussing the importance of ensuring each plane is safe and 
airworthy before it takes off). 
270 See supra note 234 and accompanying text (explaining that the public should be 
grateful for airline employees who blow the whistle). 
271 See infra notes 275–94 and accompanying text (proposing that the Supreme Court 
adopt the majority position and a clear interpretation of “services”). 
272 See supra Part II.C (discussing the two Supreme Court cases that interpreted the 
ADA’s preemption clause). 
273 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (discussing the different definitions of 
“service” adopted by the courts). 
274 See supra Part II.E (illustrating the different views taken by the circuit courts after 
enactment of the WPP). 
275 See supra notes 271–74 and accompanying text (proposing why the Court should adopt 
the majority position and reverse the Eighth Circuit). 
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whistleblower claims.276  The majority position should be adopted, and 
the Eighth Circuit overturned, because the mere enactment of a federal 
remedy is not evidence of Congress’s “clear and manifest purpose” to 
preempt of all equivalent state remedies.277  However, adoption of the 
majority position will not resolve the circuit split unless an additional 
step is taken:  clarification of “services.”278  If the majority position is 
upheld, the ADA’s preemption provision encompasses state 
whistleblower claims that relate to “services.”279  Thus, the Court must 
address whether whistleblower claims fall under “services” to ensure 
they are treated consistently among the circuits.280 
The Morales test fails to consider the WPP’s objectives because it was 
established solely for the ADA’s preemption provision.281  The Court 
should consider the purpose of the ADA in conjunction with the WPP’s 
objectives when clarifying “services” regarding state whistleblower 
claims.282  The ADA and its preemption provision were enacted to 
deregulate the airlines, ensure maximum reliance on the competitive 
market, prevent states from regulating the newly deregulated industry, 
and make airlines more customer-friendly.283  The WPP was enacted 
twenty-two years after the ADA to encourage violation reporting and 
ensure airline safety.284  Therefore, the meaning of “services” in Morales 
must be clarified with respect to the WPP and its objectives.285 
The Court should adopt a case-by-case analysis that consists of two 
steps:  (1) determine if the state whistleblower claim adversely affects the 
“services” of an airline, such that it interferes with the airline’s ability to 
                                                 
276 See supra Part II.E.2 (explaining the majority position). 
277 See supra text accompanying note 159 (stating that Congress would have enacted an 
express preemption provision in the WPP if it intended to preempt all state whistleblower 
statutes). 
278 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity of the term 
“services”). 
279 See supra Part II.E.2 (discussing why the WPP does not expand the scope of the ADA’s 
preemption provision, and further explaining why the only issue to determine is whether 
the state whistleblower claim relates to “services”). 
280 See Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
the state whistleblower claim was not preempted because it did not relate to “services” of 
an airline); cf. Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 496–97 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
state whistleblower statute related to “services”). 
281 See supra notes 54–66 and accompanying text (discussing how Morales interpreted the 
ADA’s preemption provision). 
282 See supra Part II.A–B (discussing the purpose of the ADA and its preemption 
provision); supra Part III.B (discussing why the WPP was enacted). 
283 See supra Part II.A (explaining that the ADA was enacted to deregulate the airlines). 
284 See supra Part II.D (discussing the enactment of the WPP). 
285 See supra Part II.C (discussing the interpretation of the ADA’s preemption provision); 
supra notes 174–78 and accompanying text (explaining that the WPP is related to safety and 
not economic factors such as the ADA). 
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compete in the market, and (2) balance the adverse effect the state claim 
has on airline competition against safety.286  If airline competition is 
adversely effected, the state whistleblower claim interferes with the 
ADA’s objectives.287  The proposed test balances this interference against 
safety, which is the WPP’s main objective.288  Thus, both statutes’ 
objectives are taken into account when determining preemption of state 
whistleblower claims under the ADA.289  Factors to consider under safety 
include:  (1) the effect preemption of the claim will have on future 
violation reporting; (2) the seriousness of the violation; (3) past conduct 
of the airline concerning previous violations; and (4) the amount of time 
between detecting the violation and complying with the violation.290 
The proposed clarification of “services” considers congressional 
intent and ensures that state whistleblower claims are not preempted if 
they further the values and goals intended by the WPP.291  The new 
interpretation of “services” also deters frivolous claims by preempting 
state whistleblower claims when the proper circumstances exist, such as 
when their adverse effect on airline competition outweighs safety 
concerns.292  Granting certiorari, adopting the majority approach, and 
clarifying “services” regarding whistleblower claims will resolve the 
circuit split by providing an approach that can be applied successfully 
and consistently among the courts.293  Furthermore, this solution gives 
airline employees the opportunity to pursue state whistleblower claims, 
which benefits the airline industry similar to the proposed amendment 
discussed in Part IV.A:  Airline employees will have increased 
whistleblower protection, which will encourage violation reporting and 
promote safety in the airline industry.294 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Dave would benefit from either of the proposed solutions.  The 
amended WPP would give Dave the option to pursue either a state or 
                                                 
286 This proposed test is the contribution of the author. 
287 See supra Part II.A (discussing the history and purpose behind the ADA). 
288 See supra Part III.B (stating the objectives of the WPP). 
289 See supra text accompanying note 286 (explaining how to incorporate the goals of each 
statute into an analysis to determine if state whistleblower claims fall under “services”). 
290 These proposed factors are the contribution of the author. 
291 See supra Part III.B (explaining the goals Congress intended when it enacted the WPP). 
292 See supra text accompanying note 286 (explaining that state whistleblower claims are 
preempted if their interference with airline competition outweighs the safety concerns). 
293 See supra text accompanying note 286 (proposing a test that clarifies “services,” which 
can be applied consistently across the circuits). 
294 See supra notes 255–70 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of allowing 
state whistleblower claims to be brought by airline employees). 
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federal claim.  Thus, Dave would be allowed to proceed with his state 
whistleblower claim and avoid the hassle involved with filing a 
complaint with the DOL.  The court would also find that Dave’s claim is 
not preempted by the WPP if it applied the majority position with the 
new “services” analysis.  Even if the court found his claim was related to 
“services” and interfered with the ADA’s objectives, the court would 
find that the safety concerns in Dave’s case strongly outweigh the 
interference, and Dave would succeed in pursuing his state claim.  There 
is no “clear and manifest purpose” of Congress regarding preemption of 
state whistleblower claims under the WPP.  If Congress intended such a 
result, it would have enacted an express preemption provision in the 
statute.  Furthermore, airline employees deserve proper whistleblower 
protection.  Providing airline employees with both state and federal 
remedies will increase the amount of whistleblower protection available 
to employees, which will encourage violation reporting and ensure that 
safety in the airlines remains a top priority.  Therefore, state 
whistleblower claims should not be preempted by the ADA, as amended 
by the WPP. 
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